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We examine the financing and debt maturity choices made by undiversified large 
shareholders or owner-managers. The interplay between the objective of the 
undiversified, self-interested owner-manager who controls the firm and the valuation of 
the firm’s marketed claims by well-diversified outside investors, has a major impact on 
leverage and debt maturity choices as well as credit spreads.  The effect of this interplay 
is particularly significant in a world where the representative investor (who determines 
asset prices in the economy) is risk-averse leading to nonzero market prices of systematic 
risk and risk premia of the firm’s investment opportunities. In a perfect information 
framework with no taxes or bankruptcy costs, we show that, the owner-manager could, 
depending on the projects’ characteristics, finance them exclusively with debt, 
exclusively with equity, or with a combination of equity and debt. Ceteris paribus, 
leverage increases with the expected growth rate of firm value under its investment 
opportunities, and decreases with its volatility. Debt maturity varies non-monotonically in 
a U-shaped manner with the expected growth rate, and decreases with the volatility. Our 
results reconcile empirical evidence on the variation of financing choices with firm 
characteristics that is not completely consistent with previous theories.  The significant 
impact of the expected returns (therefore, risk premia) of firms’ investment opportunities 
on their leverage ratios, debt maturities, and credit spreads are important implications of 
our theory that cannot be obtained in these models or in models in which all agents are 
risk-neutral so that risk premia are zero. We empirically test the implications of our 
theory for the relationships among firms’ financing and debt maturity choices and the 
expected growth rate and volatility of their asset values. Controlling for all the significant 
 x
determinants of firms’ financing and debt maturity choices identified by earlier studies, 
we show significant empirical support for our predictions.  
The whole dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter I, we present our 
theory in a parsimonious two-time period model, which highlights the key analytical 
results and economic intuition on the variation of financing and debt maturity vis-à-vis 
the quality of underlying project. In Chapter II, we recast our theory with a more 
sophisticated continuous-time structural model under rational expectations. The results 
obtained from the two-period model are confirmed and enriched along new dimensions of 
project drift, volatility and credit spreads. Furthermore, the continuous-time model yields 
a set of empirical implications that can be readily tested with corporate finance and debt 
maturity data. We present our empirical analysis in Chapter III, where we test our model 
predictions using data from COMPUSTAT, CRSP and FISD databases. 
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CHAPTER I   
 




Since the seminal study of Jensen and Meckling (1976), the importance of agency 
conflicts among a firm’s stakeholders; shareholders, bondholders, and the manager; in 
understanding a firm’s financing and investment decisions is now widely accepted.  In 
particular, a number of studies focus on the impact of conflicts of interest between 
managers and shareholders on firms’ capital structures (for example, Grossman and Hart 
1982, Jensen 1986, Harris and Raviv 1990 and Stulz 1990). However, as more recent 
studies such as Zwiebel (1996) emphasize, these theories assume that financing choices 
are made by diversified, value-maximizing (original or current) shareholders.  In reality, 
it is unclear whether “outside” shareholders, especially in diffusely owned firms, have a 
significant influence on firms’ financing decisions, which are usually made by managers. 
In fact, in a recent survey of corporate managers, Graham and Harvey (2001) find that the 
most important factor influencing managers’ capital structure choices is “financial 
flexibility”.  Bertrand and Schoar (2003) document that manager “fixed effects” explain a 
substantial portion of the variation in financing choices across firms. 
 In this chapter, we examine the financing and debt maturity choices of an owner-
manager, or alternatively, a manager who acts in the interests of large shareholders or 
“insiders”, in a parsimonious two-period binomial model. In contrast with the firm’s 
diversified “outside” investors (shareholders and bondholders), the manager of the firm is 
undiversified since she has significant human capital invested in the firm, and her income 
from operating the firm is a substantial portion of her wealth. The undiversified owner-
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manager chooses simultaneously the firm’s capital structure, and the maturity of its debt, 
to maximize her discounted expected utility.  
We propose an analytically tractable two-period framework to illustrate 
manager’s financing and debt maturity decisions. We assume a world with perfect 
information, no tax advantages of debt or bankruptcy costs. The firm’s market value 
follows a binomial tree. In each period, firm value grows by the proportion (1+u) with 
probability p and declines by the proportion (1-u) with probability 1-p. Our analytical 
results show that 1) the manager chooses all-equity financing when p is below a non-
trivial threshold value p1. In most parameter range, there also exist non-trivial thresholds 
in the order of p2, p3, p4. such that 2) if ),( 21 ppp∈  , the manager chooses long-term 
debt, 3) if ),( 32 ppp ∈ , she chooses short-term debt, and 4) if ),( 43 ppp ∈ , she chooses 
long-term debt again. The maturity of the firm’s debt varies in a non-monotonic manner 
with the quality of the project, measured by the probability p of the up-tick in the 
binomial tree. 
In this simple binomial model, the probability p of the up-tick path reflects the 
quality of the project that is the key to the financing decisions made by the utility-
maximizing owner-manager. In contrast, the outside investors value the firm’s debt and 
equity dependent only upon the risk-neutral probability 0.5. Thus, higher p project 
induces the owner manager to choose higher level of debt to increase her equity stake. In 
choosing the debt maturity, the manager balances the tradeoff between the possibility of 
refinancing short maturity debt at a lower cost versus the possibility of higher liquidity 
risk and loss of control benefits thereof. The complex opposing effects of liquidity risk 
and refinancing opportunity on the manager’s utility lead to a non-monotonic, U-shape 
debt maturity pattern. 
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to simultaneously examine 
optimal leverage and debt maturity choices by a utility-maximizing owner-manager using 
a discrete-time model. Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991) examine debt maturity 
choices by managers in two-period “asymmetric information” models where financing is 
restricted exclusively to debt. Flannery (1986) predicts that debt maturity declines 
monotonically with project quality whereas Diamond (1991) predicts a non-monotonic 
variation; specifically high and low quality projects are financed with shorter maturity 
debt compared with projects of intermediate quality. Kale and Noe (1990) and Goswami, 
Noe and Rebello (1995) also examine debt maturity choices in asymmetric information 
frameworks in a discrete time model. They show that if the asymmetry of information is 
concentrated around long-term cash flows, firms finance with coupon-bearing long-term 
debt. If the asymmetry of information is concentrated around near-term cash flows, firms 
finance with coupon-bearing long-term debt. Finally, if the asymmetry of information is 
uniformly distributed, firm finances with short-term debt.  
In contrast with these predictions, however, Mitchell (1991, 1993) documents a 
positive relation between debt maturity and ex post project quality measured by the 
growth of net operating income, and Guedes and Opler (1996) document that very high 
quality firms are dominant in the extremely long-maturity debt market. Berger et al 
(2005) document that borrowers with low ratings are more likely to issue longer-term 
debt, a finding that is inconsistent with Diamond’s (1991) predictions. Furthermore, 
empirical evidence is inconclusive on whether signaling and information asymmetries 
play crucial roles in affecting financing and debt maturity choices, see for example, 
Barclay and Smith (1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996). “Information asymmetry” does 
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not necessarily play an important role in explaining firms’ leverage and debt maturity 
choices. 
As mentioned earlier, these empirical findings can be reconciled within our 
framework where debt maturity varies in a non-monotonic manner with project quality. 
The significant differences between our predictions and those of Flannery (1986) and 
Diamond (1991) arise due to important distinctions between our frameworks. First, ours 
is a “perfect information” model where the manager may issue both debt and equity. 
Therefore, leverage and debt maturity are simultaneously determined endogenously. Our 
first prediction holds that if the project quality is below a threshold level, the manager 
will choose all-equity financing, which may explain Mayer and Sussman (2004)’s finding 
that large profitable firms use debt financing while loss-making small firm more 
frequently resort to equity financing. Our subsequent predictions link the variations of 
debt maturity with project quality that cannot be obtained in these “pure debt financing” 
models. Second, in Diamond’s (1991) framework, negative NPV projects are also riskier 
than positive NPV projects. In our “perfect information” model, however, all projects that 
are financed have positive NPV, and we make no assumptions about the relationship 
between the risk of a project and its NPV.  
Zwiebel (1996) develops a three-period model of dynamic financing where a 
manager’s financing choices reflect the tradeoff between empire building desires and 
control challenges. Investors and the manager are risk neutral in his setting. His analysis, 
however, leads to counterfactual implication that long-term debt is preferred when the 
firm’s project quality low. Similar to Zwiebel (1996), financing decisions are controlled 
by managers in our framework. However, we do not assume the risk neutrality of the 
manager the presence of control challenge. Furthermore, our analysis leads to a larger set 
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of predictions regarding the variation of leverage and debt maturity choices with 
underlying project characteristics.  
1.2. The Two-Period Model 
1.2.1. Model Setup 
 We consider a two-period binomial model with dates 0, 1, 2. A cash constrained 
entrepreneur or owner-manager approaches the capital markets at date zero to finance a 
project.  She could finance the project through debt, equity, or a combination of debt and 
equity. The initial required investment is I , but the project’s market value is IV >)0(  (in 
our rational world with perfect information, a necessary condition for the project to be 
financed is that it have nonnegative NPV). In order to highlight the impact of the owner-
manager’s incentives on financing choices, we abstract from other factors that influence 
financing choices such as taxes and firm-level bankruptcy costs.   
 
T=1,V = 1- u 
T=1,V= 1+u 




Figure1: A Binomial Model of Firm Value Process 
T=2, V = (1 + u)(1-u) 






The owner-manager continues to operate the firm after date zero.  The market for 
capital provision by outside investors is perfectly competitive so that the market values of 
outsiders’ stakes in the firm are equal to their investments.  Hence, the owner-manager 
captures the surplus from the project.  Alternatively, we could view the owner-manager 
as representing the “original” shareholders” or “insiders”, while the “new” shareholders 
are the “outsiders”. The assumption that the owner-manager has the bargaining power is 
made purely for simplicity. In fact, all our results hold in a setting where the owner-
manager issues debt at its market value, but bargains with new shareholders to determine 
her resulting ownership stake in the firm so that the surplus from the project is shared 
between the owner-manager and the new shareholders. Hence, we use the term “owner-
manager” for concreteness thereafter. 
The state variable is the market value of the firm (equity + debt) at each date.  In 
the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, or informational asymmetries, leverage does not 
affect firm value.  However, the undiversified owner-manager’s discounted expected 
utility does depend on the firm’s leverage and the maturity of its debt so that she is not 
indifferent to the choice of financing.  
For simplicity, we assume that all payout flows occur at the terminal date and we 
set the risk-free rate to zero. We normalize units so that the initial firm value 1)0( =V  and 
initial investment )1,0(∈I . In each period, firm value grows by the proportion )1( u+  with 
probability )1,0(∈p  and declines by the proportion )1( u−  with probability p−1  where 
]1,0[∈u .  Hence, at date 1, firm value is )1(or   )1( uu −+  with probability p  or p−1 , 
respectively, and at date 2, firm value is 222 )1(,1,)1( uuu −−+  with probabilities 
22 )1(),1(2, pppp −− , respectively.  
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By the theory of risk-neutral valuation (see Duffie, 2001), the market value of the 
firm at any date is the expectation of its end-of-period value under the risk-neutral or 
“equivalent martingale” probability measure (recall that the risk-free rate is zero). Since 
the proportional change in firm value in each period is either )1(or     )1( uu −+ , the risk-
neutral probability of an “up-tick” in each period is 0.5.  The actual up-tick probability 
)1,0(∈p  determines the expected return of the project and, therefore, its risk premium. In 
the following, we show that the actual probability p  crucially affects the owner-
manager’s choice of leverage as well as the maturity and risk of the firm’s debt. 
Since the risk-free rate is zero and the proportional change in firm value in each 
period is either u+1  or u−1 , the risk-neutral probability of an up-tick or down-tick in 
each period is 0.5 regardless of the value of u . This feature of the two-period model 
presented here is purely for simplicity because our objective in this section is to illustrate 
the intuition underlying the key insights of this study in the simplest possible setting. Our 
results hold in a more general model where the risk-free rate is nonzero and/or the 
proportional change in firm value in each period is 2121 ;1;1 uuuu ≠−+  so that the risk-
neutral probabilities depend on 21 ,uu  (details available upon request). In the continuous 
time model presented in the next section, we consider a nonzero risk-free rate and allow 
for the risk-neutral distribution of the asset value process to vary. 
At date zero, the owner-manager could finance the project through a combination 
of debt and equity. We restrict consideration to zero coupon debt for simplicity (we 
consider coupon-bearing debt in the continuous-time model presented in the next 
section).  The manager either chooses long maturity debt that matures at date 2 or 
chooses short maturity debt that matures at date 1 and is re-financed for the second 
period (see Diamond, 1991).  Let IP ≤  denote the portion of the initial required 
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investment I  that is financed through debt; the portion PI −  is raised through equity. In 
our perfect information world with rational expectations, P  equals the market value of 
the firm’s debt, PI −  is the market value of the firm’s “outside” equity. By the theory of 
contingent claims valuation, the market values of the firm’s debt and outside equity equal 
the risk-neutral expectations of future payouts to debt-holders and outside shareholders, 
respectively (recall that the risk-free rate is zero). Because the market for capital 
provision is perfectly competitive, the surplus I−1  of the project accrues to the owner-
manager.  The owner-manager’s equity stake in the firm is, therefore,   








)( .           (1) 
The argument of the equity stake explicitly indicates its dependence on the amount of 
capital debt P  raised through debt financing; this dependence plays an important role in 
our analysis.  
 In addition to the payoffs from her equity stake in the firm, the owner-manager 
also derives observable, but non-verifiable, control benefits at date 1, which are 
proportional to the value of the firm’s total equity (see Zwiebel, 1996, Dyck and 
Zingales, 2004). Specifically, the owner-manager’s control benefits at date 1 are equal to 
Equity) of (Valueε  where )1,0(∈ε .  In addition, we assume that I−<1ε , which ensures 
that the manager’s proportional control benefits cannot exceed her own equity stake in 
the firm.  As in DeMarzo and Fishman (2003), the owner-manager has linear inter-
temporal preferences with a discount rate that is set to zero for simplicity (we consider a 
nonzero discount rate in the continuous time model).  
The Owner-Manager’s Expected Payoff at Date 0 from Choosing Long-Maturity Debt: 
Suppose that the owner-manager issues long-maturity debt with face value LD  due at 
date 2 (recall that all debt is zero-coupon). By the theory of risk-neutral valuation, the 
 9 
market value of debt at date 0 (therefore, the amount raised through debt financing) is the 
risk-neutral expectation of the payoffs to bondholders. Due to the presence of limited 
liability, the market value of debt at date 0 is  
  [ ] [ ] [ ]LLLL DuDuDuP ,)1(inf25.0,1inf5.0,)1(inf25.0 222 −+−++=       (2) 
Note that, because the maximum possible value of debt is I , the face value LD  must be 
such that IPL ≤ . By (1) and (2), the owner-manager’s equity stake is  
     )1/()1()( LL PIPf −−= .            (3)
 In order to derive the owner-manager’s control benefits at the intermediate date 1, 
we need the value of equity at date 1, which depends on the “state” at date 1, that is, 
whether the firm value at date 1 is u+1  or u−1 . The equity values in these two states are 
equal to the risk-neutral expectations of the total payoffs to equity-holders (insiders + 
outsiders) and are given by 
   
[ ] [ ]














          (4) 
The superscripts indicate the dependence of the equity value on the firm value at date 1. 
By (2), (3), and (4), the manager’s total expected payoff at date 0 from issuing 
long-maturity debt with face value LD  is 
( )











)1()1()1()1(2)1()(                  
)1()( ε
 (5) 
The first term on the right hand side of (5) is the manager’s expected payoff from her 
control benefits while the second term is the expectation of the payoff at date 2 from her 
equity stake in the firm.  The actual probability of an “up-tick” p  appears in the 
expressions since the manager cares about her actual expected payoff.  
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The Owner-Manager’s Expected Payoff at Date 0 from Choosing Short-Maturity Debt:  
Suppose now that the owner-manager issues short-maturity debt at date 0 with face value 
SD  due at date 1. This debt is re-financed (if possible) at date 1, that is, the market value 
of newly issued one-period debt at date 1 equals SD . Bankruptcy is declared at date 1 if 
uDS −>1 . In this scenario, existing debt obligations cannot be re-financed because the 
maximum possible proceeds from the issuance of new debt equal the firm value u−1 .  
 The market value SP  of the firm’s debt at date zero (the amount raised through 
debt financing) is 
    [ ] ]),1inf[(5.0),1(inf5.0 SSS DuDuP −++=          (6) 









)( .  The face value of newly issued one-period debt at date 1 depends on 
whether the firm value at date 1 is u+1  or u−1 .  If firm value is u+1 , the face value of 
newly issued debt uD +1  must be such that its market value at date 1 equals SD  (the 
superscript indicates the dependence of the face value of new debt on the current “state”), 
that is, 
   [ ] [ ] Suu DDuDu =−++ ++ 1212 ),1(inf5.0,)1(inf5.0          (7) 
If uDS −>1 , bankruptcy is declared when firm value is u−1 since existing debt 
obligations cannot be met. For subsequent notational convenience, we set ∞=−uD1  in 
this scenario. If uDS −≤1 , then the face value of newly issued debt 
uD −1 is given by 
  [ ] [ ] Suu DDuDu =−+− −− 1212 ,)1(inf5.0),1(inf5.0          (8) 
The values of equity at the intermediate date 1 are  
   [ ] [ ]+−++ −−=−+= SuSu DuEDuE )1(    ;)1( 11           (9) 
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The manager's expected payoff from choosing short maturity debt with face value SD  is 
( ) [ ]
























        (10) 
The Owner-Manager’s Objective:  At date 0, the owner-manager decides whether to 
issue long – maturity or short maturity debt and chooses the corresponding face values 
SL DD , , respectively, to maximize her total expected future payoffs. The following 
proposition describes the manager’s optimal financing and debt maturity choices. Its 
statement is complicated somewhat by the fact that the amount of debt financing (the 
market value of debt at date zero) is bounded above by the initial investment I .  
1.2.2. Results and Discussions 
Proposition 1:  Let debt allLD  be the face value of long term debt when the manager 
chooses long-term all debt financing and let debt allSD be the face value of short term debt 
in the first period when the manager chooses short term all debt financing (the market 
value of debt at date zero in each of these scenarios is, therefore, equal to the initial 
investment I ). There exist 321 ,, ppp  (that depend on ε , u , and I ) with 
3215.0 ppp ≤≤<  such that the manager chooses  
(i) all-equity financing for 1pp < ,  
(ii) long maturity risk-free debt with face value ),)1min(( debt all2 LDu−  for ),( 21 ppp∈ ,  
(iii) short maturity debt with face value ),1min( debt allSDu−  for ),( 32 ppp∈ ,  
(iv)  long maturity debt with face value ),1min( debt all2 LDu−  for 3pp >  (this debt is 
risky if 2debt all )1( uDL −> ) 
Proof.  See Appendix A. 
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Note: The inequalities 321 ppp ≤≤  are not strict indicating that, for some parameter 
values, the intervals ),( 21 pp  and/or ),( 32 pp  could be empty. 
 We observe that the market values of the firm’s debt (hence, its leverage) 
progressively increase from case (i) to case (iv) above, while debt maturity varies non-
monotonically in a U-shaped manner.  Hence, the results of Proposition 1 lead to the 
following implications: 
• Leverage increases monotonically with the actual “up-tick”  probability p  in each 
period and, therefore, the expected growth of firm/asset value (alternatively, the 
risk premium of the project). 
• If the manager issues nonzero debt, its maturity varies non-monotonically in a U-
shaped manner, in general, with the “up-tick” probability p  and, therefore, the 
expected growth of firm/asset value. 
• The risk of the firm’s debt (therefore, its credit spread) is significantly affected by 
the “up-tick” probability p .  
The manager’s choice of the level of debt financing is the outcome of the tradeoff 
between the positive effect of the debt level on her equity stake in the firm (see (3)) and 
the negative effect of the debt level on the manager’s expected control benefits.  The 
manager’s subjective valuation of the project increases with the up-tick probability p .  By 
the theory of risk-neutral valuation, however, the market values of the firm’s debt and 
equity only depend on the risk-neutral up-tick probability 0.5, and not on the actual 
probability p .  For lower values of p , the effect of the manager’s expected control 
benefits at date 1 dominates so that she chooses lower levels of debt. At higher values of 
p , the manager’s high subjective valuation of the project causes the effect of the 
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manager’s payoffs from her equity stake in the firm to dominate, thereby inducing her to 
choose higher levels of debt in order to increase her equity stake. 
The manager’s choice of debt maturity reflects the tradeoff between the 
probability of re-financing short maturity debt at more favorable terms at date 1 versus 
the higher liquidity risk due to the possibility of bankruptcy in state u−1  and the 
accompanying loss of control benefits. At lower values of p , the “liquidity risk” effect 
dominates so that the manager issues long maturity debt. At intermediate values of p , the 
“re-financing” effect increases so that the manager issues short maturity debt.  The 
manager’s choice of leverage, however, increases with p .  When the probability p  is 
above a threshold, the high debt levels cause the “liquidity risk” effect to dominate the 
“re-financing” effect thereby inducing the manager to issue long maturity debt.  
 In Table 1, we illustrate the results of Proposition 1 by deriving the owner-
manager’s choice of leverage and debt maturity for varying values of the up-tick 
parameter u  and probability p .  The notation is explained in the table's legend. An 
examination of the columns of the table reveals the following: 
• For low values of u , the manager chooses all-equity financing when p  is below a 
threshold (case (i) of Proposition 1) and long maturity risky debt with face value 
21 u−  when it is above the threshold (case (iv) of Proposition 1). In other words, 
for low values of the up-tick parameter u , only two of the four possible 
“financing regions” described in Proposition 1 appear.   
• For intermediate values of u , there exist two triggers such that the manager 
chooses all-equity financing when p  is below the lower trigger, long maturity 
risky debt with face value 21 u−  when it is above the higher trigger, and short 
maturity debt with face value )1( u−  between the triggers. In other words, for 
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intermediate values of the up-tick parameter u , three of the four possible 
financing regions described in Proposition 1 appear. In these scenarios, both 
leverage and debt maturity increase with p .  
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Table 1:  Financing and Debt Maturity Choices generated by Two-Period Binomial 
Model 
 
The table presents results of simulations of the two period binomial model. The initial 
investment outlay I  is set to 0.9 and the proportional control benefits parameter ε  is set 
to 0.25. We vary the “up-tick” parameter u  and the “up-tick” probability p  as shown in 
the table and indicate the manager’s optimal choice of leverage and debt maturity.  “E” 
indicates that the manager chooses all-equity financing, “SM” indicates that the manager 
chooses short maturity debt with face value u−1 , “LM/RF” indicates that the manager 
chooses long maturity risk-free debt with face value 2)1( u−  and “LM/R” indicates that 
the manager chooses long maturity risky debt with face value 21 u− . 
 
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
0.5 E E E E E E E E E E
0.505 E E E E E E E E E E
0.51 E E E E E E E E E E
0.515 E E E E E E E E E E
0.52 E E E E E E E E E E
0.525 E E E E E E E E E E
0.53 E E E E E E E E E E
0.535 E E E E E E E E E E
0.54 E E E E E E E E E E
0.545 E E E E E E E E E E
0.55 E E E E E E E E E E
0.555 E E E E E E E E E E
0.56 E E E E E E E E E E
0.565 E E E E E E E E LM/RF LM/RF
0.57 E E E E E E E LM/RF LM/RF LM/RF
0.575 LM/R LM/R E SM SM SM SM SM SM SM
0.58 LM/R LM/R LM/R SM SM SM SM SM SM SM
0.585 LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R SM SM SM SM SM SM
0.59 LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R SM SM SM SM SM
0.595 LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R SM SM SM SM
0.6 LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R SM SM SM SM
0.605 LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R SM SM SM
0.61 LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R SM SM
0.615 LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R SM
0.62 LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R
0.625 LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R
0.63 LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R
0.635 LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R
0.64 LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R
0.645 LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R LM/R








• For high values of u , all the four possible financing regions described in 
Proposition 1 appear so that debt maturity varies in a U-shaped manner with p .  
The results of Table 1 (which are robust to alternative choices of values for the 
initial investment I  and the control benefits ε ) suggest that, for typical parameter values, 
both leverage and debt maturity increase with the expected growth of firm value.  These 
observations extend to the continuous-time model analyzed in Sections IV and V and are 
also supported by our empirical analysis of the financing choices of firms in Section VI.   
We emphasize that, in Proposition 1, the NPV of the project is fixed at I−1 . 
Hence, the owner-manager’s leverage and debt maturity choices vary significantly with 
the up-tick probability p  although the NPV of the project is fixed. As mentioned earlier, 
the up-tick probability determines the project’s risk premium. If all investors are assumed 
to be risk-neutral (as in a large number of studies in the literature), risk premia are equal 
to zero so that the actual up-tick probability coincides with the risk-neutral probability 
0.5.  Hence, the risk aversion of investors, as reflected in the deviation of the actual 
probability p  from the risk-neutral probability 0.5, is a key driver of the variations in the 
owner-manager’s leverage and debt maturity choices described in Proposition 1. We also 
note that a change in the up-tick probability p  affects the expected growth and volatility 
of firm value in this stylized two-period binomial model. In the more general continuous-
time model developed in the next section, we are able to disentangle the effects of the 
expected growth and volatility on leverage and debt maturity. 
The analysis of the two-period binomial model highlights the significant impact 
of the interplay between the actual distribution of payoffs from the project (determined 
by the parameter p ), and the risk-adjusted or risk-neutral distribution of payoffs, on the 
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owner-manager’s leverage and debt maturity choices, the risk of the firm’s debt, and its 
credit spread. In Chapter II, we show that these implications and the intuition underlying 
them extend to a more general, continuous time setting. 
 
1.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we propose a parsimonious two-period model to examine the 
financing and debt maturity choice by an undiversified utility-maximizing owner 
manager. We show that the manager chooses all-equity financing if the project quality is 
below a threshold level. Above this level, the manager prefers debt to equity. She chooses 
long maturity debt with a high or low quality project, short maturity debt with a medium 
quality project. Our model predictions can better explain the empirical evidence than 
existing discrete-time model based on the framework of information asymmetries. 
This simple binomial model captures the essence of owner-manager’s financing 
decision to maximizing her own utility. The mathematically tractable model enables us to 
obtain the analytical results. It illustrates the economic dynamics of the variations of 
financing and debt maturity choices with different underlying projects in an intuitive 
way. However, all these are achieved at the expense of the model sophistication. The 
dynamic behavior which we observed in the real world can not be fully represented in a 
two-period model. In our model, the payout flow occurs only in the second period. In the 
real world, businesses are run as going concerns. Second, we model default event to be 
automatically triggered when the market asset value goes down to the debt value. In 
reality, it is more plausible that default happens when existing shareholders are not 
willing to service the debt. In other words, default should be modeled as an endogenous 
event. Lastly, short of a more sophisticated structural model, it is difficult to yield 
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quantitative implications on risky debt credit spreads. In order to address those issues, we 
develop a continuous-time structural model in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER II  
 
CONTINUOUS TIME STRUCTURAL MODEL 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 We develop a parsimonious two-period monomial model in the previous chapter 
to explain financing and debt maturity choices of an undiversified owner-manager. Our 
model yields insights in the interplay of manager’s own utility-maximizing motivation 
and firm’s project characteristics on firms’ finance and debt maturity choice. However, 
the binomial model has limitations due to its two-period time setting. The firm ceases to 
exist after the second period. Clearly this assumption violates the observations that most 
firms operate in much longer period. Second, the default is automatically triggered when 
the market value of total assets falls to the debt value. In reality, a firm can remain in the 
shareholders’ control as long as they are willing to raise new financing to service existing 
debt. Third, the binomial model does not yield quantitative implications on actual 
maturity and credit spreads. Lastly, the quality of the project is characterized by the 
probability of the up-tick in the project value binomial tree. This probability is hard to 
estimate unambiguously from empirical data, which hinders empirical testing on the 
validity of our model.  
Therefore, in this chapter, we develop a continuous-time structural model to with 
rational expectation to examine the financing and debt maturity choices of owner-
managers. The undiversified owner-manager chooses the firm’s capital structure, and the 
maturity of its debt, to maximize her discounted expected utility. . In a perfect 
information framework, we show that the interplay between the objective of the 
undiversified, self-interested owner-manager who controls the firm, and the valuation of 
the firm’s claims from the perspective of well-diversified "outside" investors, 
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significantly influences leverage and debt maturity decisions as well as credit spreads.  
The impact of this interplay is particularly pronounced in a world where the 
representative investor (who determines asset prices in the economy) is risk-averse 
leading to nonzero market prices of systematic risk and risk premia of the firm’s projects.  
In a world with perfect information, no tax advantages of debt or bankruptcy 
costs, we show that the manager, in general, finances the firm’s operations with nonzero 
proportions of debt and equity. Leverage increases with the ex post (after debt is in place) 
expected growth rate, and decreases with the standard deviation, of the firm’s value. The 
credit spreads on the firm’s debt are significantly higher than those predicted by 
traditional structural models where financing decisions are made by diversified, value-
maximizing (original or current) shareholders. The maturity of the firm’s debt varies in a 
non-monotonic manner with the expected ex post growth rate and declines with the ex 
post volatility of firm value. Our results reconcile empirical evidence on the relations 
between firm leverage and debt maturity with underlying firm characteristics that are not 
completely consistent with existing theoretical models 
The significant variations of leverage, debt maturity, and credit spreads with the 
actual distribution of firm value (in particular, its expected growth rate), which depends 
on the risk premia of the firm's projects, are key predictions of our analysis. These 
predictions cannot be obtained in models in which financing decisions are made by 
value-maximizing shareholders because leverage, debt maturity, and credit spreads only 
depend on the risk-neutral (or risk-adjusted) distribution of firm value in these models 
(for example, Fischer et al, 1989, Leland and Toft, 1996). They cannot be obtained either 
in models where investors are assumed to be risk-neutral so that risk premia are zero 
(Zwiebel, 1996). We show significant support for the primary implications of our theory 
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in our empirical analysis of the financing of incremental investments by firms. Our 
theoretical and empirical analyses together suggest that undiversified large shareholders 
or owner-managers significantly influence firms' financing decisions. 
Consider a cash-constrained entrepreneur or owner-manager approaches the 
capital markets to finance a project at the initial date (the owner-manager could also be 
viewed as representing the firm’s large, controlling shareholders). The manager could 
finance the project through equity and debt.  Since our focus is on the impact of the 
owner-manager's financing discretion, we assume that there are no taxes, firm-level 
bankruptcy costs, or informational asymmetries. Hence, the market value of the firm 
under the project (the market value of the claim to the project's payout flow), which is the 
state variable in our analysis, is unaffected by leverage.  The market value of the firm 
evolves as a lognormal process with a drift and volatility that are common knowledge. 
Since there are no informational asymmetries between outside investors (the market) and 
the owner-manager, the project must have positive NPV to receive external financing.   
The market for capital provision is competitive so that the market values of 
“outside” investors’ stakes (debt and equity) in the firm are equal to their investments.  
Hence, the owner-manager (alternatively, the controlling shareholders) captures the 
surplus from the project and receives the project’s residual payout flows after payouts to 
debt and outside equity.  The manager also derives private control benefits at each date 
(Zwiebel, 1996), which are proportional to the payout flow to equity.  For tractability, we 
adopt Leland’s (1994) framework where debt has infinite maturity, but could be 
continuously retired at differing rates leading to different “average” debt maturities.  In 
financial distress, debt is serviced through the issuance of additional equity. Bankruptcy 
occurs endogenously when the market value of equity falls to zero and control of the firm 
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transfers to creditors. As in DeMarzo and Fishman (2003), the manager has linear inter-
temporal preferences with a subjective discount rate. She chooses the firm’s capital 
structure and the maturity of its debt (alternatively, the debt retirement rate) to maximize 
the discounted expected utility she derives from her entire stream of future payoffs.  We 
solve the manager’s optimization problem using numerical methods to derive her optimal 
choice of leverage and debt maturity. 
The owner-manager is inherently undiversified due to her controlling ownership 
stake, control benefits, and significant human capital investment in the firm so that her 
objective deviates, in general, from value maximization.  In particular, although firm 
value is unaffected by leverage in our framework, the undiversified owner-manager is not 
indifferent to the choice of leverage. The owner-manager has linear inter-temporal 
preferences and chooses the proportion and maturity of debt in the financing of the 
project at the initial date to maximize the discounted expected payoffs from her 
ownership stake in the firm and her control benefits.  
We first examine the variation of the manager’s choice of leverage with the 
project drift, ceteris paribus (in particular, keeping the market value of the firm fixed). 
We find that leverage increases monotonically with the project drift. Specifically, when 
the project drift is extremely low, the manager chooses to finance the project exclusively 
with equity because the high probability of bankruptcy deters the manager from using 
debt financing. On the other hand, when the drift is very high, she finances the project 
exclusively with debt. When the drift is in the intermediate range, the manager chooses to 
finance the project with a combination of debt and equity.  
The intuition for these results hinges on the fact that the manager’s choice of 
leverage balances the tradeoff between two effects: increasing the debt level increases the 
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manager’s equity stake in the firm thereby allowing her to obtain a larger share of 
residual cash flows; increasing the debt level, however, also increases the probability of 
bankruptcy.  The key to understanding the interplay between these effects is the fact that, 
for a given debt structure, the market values of outside equity and debt and, in particular, 
the bankruptcy level (the value of the payout rate at which bankruptcy occurs) depends 
only on the risk-adjusted drift of the project that is constant in these simulations since the 
market value of the firm is fixed.  For a given debt structure, the probability of 
bankruptcy declines with the project drift and the manager’s expected utility increases, 
that is, the manager’s subjective valuation of the project increases. The manager, 
therefore, has the incentive to increase the level of debt as the project drift increases so 
that she can obtain a larger proportion of the firm’s residual cash flows. In our 
framework, the drift or expected growth of firm value under the project are conceptually 
different notion from firm’s “growth opportunities” that relate to the NPV of the project. 
In our model, the market value of the firm and, therefore, its book-to-market ratio and the 
project’s NPV, are fixed in these simulations. 
Next, we demonstrate that the manager’s choice of debt maturity varies in a non-
monotonic, U-shape manner with the project drift, that is, the manager issues longer-
maturity debt for low and high drifts than for intermediate drifts.  The intuition for these 
results hinges on the fact that the manager’s choice of debt maturity reflects the tradeoff 
between the possibility of refinancing the firm’s debt at more favorable terms in the 
future with shorter maturity debt versus the higher probability of bankruptcy in the near 
term, ceteris paribus.  At lower values of the project drift, the probability of favorable 
future realizations is low so that the second effect predominates and the manager issues 
longer maturity debt. As the project drift increases, the probability that the manager can 
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refinance the firm’s debt in the future at more favorable terms due to good project 
realizations increases so that debt maturity initially declines. As the project drift increases 
further, however, the manager’s choice of leverage also increases thereby increasing the 
probability of bankruptcy.  The interplay between these effects leads to the non-
monotonic variation of debt maturity with the project’s drift. Our results suggest that the 
utility benefits to the manager due to the reduction of the probability of bankruptcy 
outweigh the benefits of possible interest cost savings from shorter-term debt when the 
drift is very high. Therefore we observe that the manager choose long debt maturities 
beyond a threshold value of the project drift.  
Our results reconcile several empirical findings regarding the variation of debt 
maturity and leverage with project quality that are not completely consistent with existing 
models. Diamond (1991) predicts that low and high quality firms issue short-term debt 
whereas medium quality firms issue long-term debt. However, Mitchell (1991, 1993) 
documents a positive relation between debt maturity and ex post project quality measured 
by the growth of net operating income, and Guedes and Opler (1996) document that very 
high quality firms are dominant in the extremely long-maturity debt market. Johnson 
(2003) documents a negative relation between leverage and short debt maturity; a finding 
that cannot be explained within Diamond’s “pure debt financing” framework.  The 
empirical evidence documented by these studies is consistent with the predictions of our 
analysis that leverage increases with the project’s expected growth rate or drift, and that 
debt maturity increases with the drift if it exceeds a threshold. Nevertheless, the non-
monotonic variation of debt maturity predicted by our analysis suggest that more 
complex, non-linear, functional specifications are necessary to rigorously estimate the 
relation between debt maturity, leverage, and project quality. 
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The significant variation of leverage and debt maturity with the drift or expected 
ex post growth of firm value even though the market value of the firm and the initial 
investment outlay (therefore, the book-to-market ratio) are fixed are important 
implications of this study. In particular, these results cannot be obtained in traditional 
“contingent claims” capital structure models where financing decisions are made by 
value-maximizing shareholders (Fischer et al 1989, Leland and Toft 1996) so that only 
risk-adjusted drifts matter. They also cannot be obtained in models where all agents are 
assumed to be risk-neutral (Zwiebel 1996) so that actual and risk-adjusted drifts coincide 
since risk premia are zero. Our results, therefore, imply that when managers control 
financing decisions in a world with nonzero risk premia, the expected ex post growth rate 
of firm value is an important determinant of ex ante financing decisions. We confirm 
these implications in our empirical analysis. 
 We then examine the variations of leverage and debt maturity with the project 
volatility.  We show that, ceteris paribus, leverage decreases monotonically with project 
volatility. The manager prefers all-debt financing when volatility is low. As the project 
volatility increases, the manager chooses a nonzero proportion of equity financing.  
Beyond a threshold value of volatility, the manager finances the project exclusively 
through equity. These predictions are consistent with considerable empirical evidence 
that documents a negative relation between leverage and risk (Bradley, et al. 1984, Friend 
and Hasbrouck 1988, and Friend and Lang 1988). The result that the project is financed 
exclusively through equity if its risk exceeds a threshold is consistent with the evidence 
documented by Guedes and Opler (1999) that high-risk firms finance investments 
primarily through equity.    
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We also show that debt maturity declines monotonically with project volatility in 
the parameter range where the manager issues a combination of debt and equity. This 
prediction is consistent with the evidence documented by Stohs and Mauer (1996) who 
find a significant negative relation between debt maturity and earnings variability.  The 
intuition for these results is that, as the volatility increases, the possibility of bankruptcy 
causes the manager to lower leverage levels. However, higher volatility levels also 
increase the probability of refinancing the firm’s debt at more favorable terms in the 
future due to “good” project realizations. The manager’s choice of debt maturity reflects 
the tradeoff between these effects. Since the manager’s payoff in each period is 
proportional to the project’s payout flow, the second effect dominates the first so that the 
manager’s choice of debt maturity declines with volatility.  
We find that, in the region where the manager issues nonzero debt, credit spreads 
vary non-monotonically with the project’s drift and volatility. These results reflect the 
fact that the risk of the firm’s debt depends on the level of debt in the firm’s capital 
structure as well as the probability of bankruptcy that are determined endogenously by 
the project’s drift and volatility. For reasonable parameter values, the credit spreads 
predicted by our model are substantially higher than those predicted by earlier structural 
models where financing decisions are made by value-maximizing (original or current) 
shareholders (for example, Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner 1989, Leland 1994, Leland and 
Toft 1996, Goldstein, Ju, and Leland 2001) and are closer to those observed in reality.  
We also examine the variation of financing choices with the manager’s subjective 
discount rate or “degree of myopia” and the project’s payout ratio.  The manager’s choice 
of leverage decreases monotonically with her discount rate.  In other words, the more 
“myopic” manager with a higher discount rate adopts a more conservative financing 
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policy.  On the other hand, the manager’s leverage choices increase with the payout ratio. 
A higher payout ratio increases the manager’s payoff in each period, ceteris paribus, 
thereby increasing her discounted expected utility and reducing the relative impact of her 
personal costs due to bankruptcy.  
 Following Diamond’s (1991) theoretical study of firms’ debt maturity choices, 
several subsequent empirical studies document a non-monotonic relationship between a 
firm’s credit rating and debt maturity. In Diamond’s “pure debt financing” model, there is 
a one-one correspondence between a firm’s credit rating, and the probability that it 
undertakes a positive NPV project.  Moreover, in his framework, negative NPV projects 
are also necessarily riskier than positive NPV projects.  In our dynamic framework where 
firms can choose both equity and debt financing, a firm’s default risk (or credit rating) 
depends on the expected growth rate and volatility of firm value since they determine the 
level as well as the maturity of the firm’s debt. We disentangle the effects of drift and 
volatility on the quality of a firm’s pool of projects instead of using a single, imperfect 
measure of firm quality such as its credit rating.   
In summary, we examine the financing choices of a utility-maximizing owner-
manager in a continuous time framework. Our analysis shows that, for reasonable 
parameter values, managerial incentives lead to nontrivial leverage and debt maturity 
choices in a perfect information framework without taxes and bankruptcy costs. 1  The 
complex dynamics of leverage and debt maturity predicted by our analysis are 
significantly different from those obtained in static models, and reflect the fact that 
financing choices are made by a manager with a long-term objective function. Our study 
                                                 
1 The literature is still divided on whether tax advantages and bankruptcy costs are important determinants 
of capital structure.  Graham (2000), Hennessy and Whited (2004) examine whether the “tradeoff” theory 
can explain financing choices. These studies do not, however, examine debt maturity choices in 
 28 
suggests a tractable framework to reconcile several empirical findings on the variation of 
leverage and debt maturity choices with firm quality. Our analysis suggests that 
managerial incentives significantly influence firms’ financing decisions.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows.  We discuss related literature in 
more detail in Section II. In Section III, we present our model.  In Section IV, we analyze 
several “comparative static” relationships predicted by our model, and discuss 
connections with existing empirical evidence. Section V concludes. Proofs and numerical 
procedure are provided in Appendices B and C. 
 
2.2. Related Literature 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to simultaneously examine 
optimal leverage and debt maturity choices by a utility-maximizing owner-manager in a 
continuous time framework. Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991) examine debt maturity 
choices by managers in two-period “asymmetric information” models where financing is 
restricted exclusively to debt. Flannery (1986) predicts that debt maturity declines 
monotonically with project quality whereas Diamond (1991) predicts a non-monotonic 
variation; specifically high and low quality projects are financed with shorter maturity 
debt compared with projects of intermediate quality. 1 Kale and Noe (1990) and 
Goswami, Noe and Rebello (1995) also examine debt maturity choices in a framework 
that deals with different distribution of information asymmetries. 
In contrast with these predictions, however, Mitchell (1991, 1993) documents a 
positive relation between debt maturity and ex post project quality measured by the 
growth of net operating income, and Guedes and Opler (1996) document that very high 
                                                                                                                                                 
conjunction with capital structure decisions.  Boyce and Kalotay(1979) and Brick and Ravid(1985) 
examine the impact of taxes on debt maturity choices.  
 29 
quality firms are dominant in the extremely long-maturity debt market. Berger et al 
(2005) document that borrowers with low ratings are more likely to issue longer-term 
debt, a finding that is inconsistent with Diamond’s (1991) predictions.. 
As mentioned earlier, these empirical findings can be reconciled within our 
framework where debt maturity varies in a non-monotonic manner with project 
characteristics (the expected growth rate and volatility of firm value under the project). 
The significant differences between our predictions and those of Flannery (1986) and 
Diamond (1991) arise due to important distinctions between our frameworks. First, ours 
is a “perfect information” model where the manager may issue both debt and equity. 
Therefore, leverage and debt maturity are simultaneously determined endogenously. This 
leads to predictions about the variation of leverage and debt maturity with project quality 
that cannot be obtained in these “pure debt financing” models. Second, in Diamond’s 
(1991) framework, negative NPV projects are also riskier than positive NPV projects. In 
our “perfect information” model, however, all projects that are financed have positive 
NPV, and we make no assumptions about the relationship between the risk of a project 
and its NPV. Third, in our model, the project’s drift, volatility, and the payout ratio affect 
the manager’s financing choices since they affect her utility. We, therefore, obtain a 
richer set of implications regarding the variation of leverage and debt maturity choices 
with project characteristics.  
Empirical evidence is inconclusive on whether signaling and information 
asymmetries play crucial roles in affecting financing and debt maturity choices.  Barclay 
and Smith (1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996) find that that the economic significance of 
the effect of abnormal earnings on debt maturity choice is negligible. Guedes and Opler 
(1996) find no substantial variation by maturity in pre-issue and post-issue stock returns. 
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In a study that restricts consideration to bank loans rather than publicly issued debt, 
Berger et al (2005) do find that asymmetric information may play an important role in 
debt maturity choices. The positive implications of our “perfect information” framework 
suggest that “information asymmetry” need not play an important role in explaining 
firms’ leverage and debt maturity choices. 
Zwiebel (1996) proposes a three-period model of dynamic financing where 
entrenched managers choose leverage and debt maturity trading off “empire building” 
ambitions with the need to ensure sufficient efficiency to prevent control challenges. He 
predicts that long-term debt should be preferred when the quality of the firm’s investment 
opportunities is low. This prediction is not consistent with the empirical evidence 
described above. Similar to Zwiebel (1996), financing decisions are controlled by 
managers in our framework. In contrast, however, we do not assume private benefits of 
control or the presence of control challenges. Further, our analysis leads to a larger set of 
predictions regarding the variation of leverage and debt maturity choices with underlying 
project characteristics. Morellec (2004) extends Zwiebel’s (1996) analysis to a 
continuous-time setting. He does not focus on debt maturity choices. Aghion and 
Bolton(1992), analyze incomplete long-term financial contracts between an entrepreneur 
and an outside investor under uncertainty and noisy signals. Hart and Moore(1994) 
develop a capital structure model under perfect certainty and characterize the optimal 
repayment path. DeMarzo and Fishman (2003), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2004), and Biais 
et al (2004) develop dynamic contracting models of a manager’s financing choices. 
However, neither study focuses on, or derives implications, for debt maturity choices. 
We adopt the modeling approach of continuous time “contingent claims” models 
of firms’ financing decisions. From an economic standpoint, however, our perspective is 
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fundamentally different from “traditional” contingent claim models (for example, Fischer 
et al 1989, Leland and Toft 1996, Leland 1998, Goldstein et al 2001) in that the firm’s 
financing choices are determined by a utility-maximizing owner-manager rather than by 
diversified value-maximizing (original or current) shareholders. Conceptually, this 
implies that the subjective project drift or expected growth rate plays a prominent role in 
our analysis.  In contrast, in contingent claim models where financing choices are made 
by value-maximizing shareholders, the firm’s financing choices depend only on the risk-
neutral drift (the difference between the risk-free rate and the payout ratio) and the 
project volatility. Therefore, we are able to explain empirical evidence on the 
relationships between ex post project quality (that depends on drift as well as volatility), 
leverage and debt maturity. Leland and Toft (1996) and Titman and Tsyplakov(2002) 
develop capital structure models where  debt maturity is exogenous. Fischer et al (1989) 
and Goldstein et al (2001) assume a consol bond in their models. Christensen (2002) and 
Flor and Lester(2002) develop dynamic models of capital structure with callable debts.  
Ericsson(2000) develops a continuous time model of optimal leverage and maturity. 
These studies are fundamentally different from ours in that financing choices are made by 
diversified, value-maximizing (original or current) shareholders rather than by a utility-
maximizing manager.  In particular, none of these studies predicts the variation of 
leverage, and the complex non-monotonic variation of debt maturity, with underlying 
project characteristics (expected growth and volatility) that we obtain in our framework. 
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2.3. The Model 
2.3.1 The Payout Rate Process 
We consider a continuous-time “perfect information” framework where a cash-
constrained entrepreneur approaches the capital markets to finance a profitable project. 
The initial required investment is I , but the project’s market value is IV >)0(  (in our 
rational world with perfect information, a necessary condition for the project to be 
financed is that it have nonnegative NPV).  The entrepreneur manages the firm after the 
project is financed.  
The market for capital provision by outside investors is perfectly competitive so 
that the market values of outsiders’ stakes in the firm are equal to their investments and 
the entrepreneur captures the surplus or NPV IV −)0(  (in effect, the entrepreneur has all 
the bargaining power with outside investors).  Alternatively, we could view the 
entrepreneur as representing the “original shareholders” or “insiders” who have the 
bargaining power with bondholders and the “new shareholders” or “outsiders”.  
Henceforth, we refer to the entrepreneur or “insiders” as an owner-manager for 
expositional convenience. The assumption that the owner-manager has all the bargaining 
power is made purely for simplicity. All our results are qualitatively valid in a more 
general setting where the owner-manager issues debt that is fairly valued, but bargains 
with new shareholders to determine her resulting ownership stake in the firm so that the 
surplus from the project is shared between the owner-manager and the new shareholders. 
To illustrate the impact of the owner-manager’s incentives on financing choices, we 
consider a world with no taxes or bankruptcy costs (losses in firm value due to 
bankruptcy). 
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The fundamental variable that we model is the project’s payout rate before 
interest payments (.)∆ that evolves as follows: 
( )
( ) ( )tdwdtt
td σµ +=
∆
∆                                                             (1) 
In the above, (.)w  is a standard Brownian motion. The drift µ  and volatility σ  are 
common knowledge. For future reference, we describe the evolution of the payout rate 
process under the risk-neutral or pricing measure. If the market price of risk 
corresponding to the Brownian motion (.)w  is a constant λ , the payout rate process 
evolves as follows under the risk-neutral measure: 




)(        (2) 
In (2), w  is a Brownian motion under the risk-neutral probability and µ  is the risk-
adjusted drift of the project. By the theory of contingent claims valuation (Duffie 2001), 
the market value of the firm )(tV (the claim to the entire payout flow) at any date t is the 
discounted risk-neutral expectation of the payout flows from the project where the 
discounting is at the risk-free rate r , which is assumed to be constant. Therefore,     





















                                          (3) 
In (3), tE  is the expectation (at date t ) under the risk-neutral probability measure. 
The risk-free rate, that is assumed to be constant, is denoted by r. Since the denominator 
in the is a constant, (.)V  and (.)∆ share the same dynamics. Hence the “gains process” 
(see Duffie 2001) follows: 
                                     ( )tdwdt
V
dttdV σµ +=∆+ )(                                              (4) 
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Defining µδ −= r , which is he project’s payout ratio, the market value of the firm 
evolves as follows: 
( )tdwdt
V
dV σδµ +−= )(                                                 (5) 
For future reference, the market value of the firm evolves as follows under the risk-
neutral measure: 
                                       ( )twddtr
V
dV σδ +−= )(                                    (6) 
In our world with perfect information and no taxes or bankruptcy costs, the 
market value of the firm V  is the sum of the market values of the stakes of all claimants 
to the firm’s payout flow, that is, the owner-manager, outside equity-holders, and outside 
debt-holders. In our subsequent analysis, we use firm value V  as the state variable whose 
evolution is described by (4).  A project, therefore, is characterized by three parameters: 
µ, the drift, or the expected growth rate of the asset value, σ, the volatility, and δ, the 
payout ratio. This permits a characterization of a wide range of possible projects. For 
example, a high drift, high volatility and low payout project could be typical of a “high 
technology” growth firm; a low drift, low volatility and high payout project might 
characterize a firm in a mature industry with relatively few growth opportunities; a low 
drift, high volatility, and low payout project might characterize a firm facing significant 
uncertainty in a troubled industry.  
The difference between the initial firm value )0(V and the investment I is the net 
present value (NPV) of the project. In a world with perfect information, it is necessary for 
the project to have positive NPV for it to be financed. Since the market for capital 
provision by outside investors is perfectly competitive, the surplus IV −)0(  accrues to the 
owner-manager.  If IP ≤  denotes the amount of the initial investment that is financed 
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through debt so that PI −  is financed through “outside equity”, the owner manager, 
therefore, effectively has an equity stake in the firm given by 







)0(             (7) 
The key aspect of our framework, however, is that the owner-manager is undiversified so 
that she cares about maximizing the discounted expected utility she derives from her 
ownership stake in the firm rather than its market value.  
2.3.2 The Debt Structure and Bankruptcy 
The debt structure is described by the principal, the coupon rate, and the maturity. 
Since we consider a firm with a single investment opportunity that arrives at date 0, we 
follow Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991) in restricting consideration to dynamic 
refinancing of existing debt. For tractability, we adopt the framework of Leland (1994) 
where debt has infinite maturity, but is continuously retired at par and replaced by newly-
issued debt. For simplicity, we restrict consideration to simple debt without call, 
convertible or any other complex features  This leads to a finite “average” debt maturity.  
As in Leland (1994), debt is initially issued at par so that the principal P  equals the 
amount raised through debt financing.  Subsequently, however, new debt is issued at its 
market value that, in general, differs from the par value.  
At any time t after date zero, a proportion dtme mt−  of debt issued at 0=t  is 
retired and replaced with new debt. Therefore, the proportion of initially issued debt still 
outstanding at date t  is mte− . Let ),(),,( tctp ττ denote the principal and coupon of debt 
outstanding at time of t that is issued at time t≤τ . Since the debt principal is retired at 
constant rate of m continuously, we have:  








                                                       (8) 
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The outstanding principal and coupon and the replacing principal and coupon have the 
following relationship: 
( ) ( )Petp tm ττ −−=,                                                           (9) 
( ) ( )Cetc tm ττ −−=,                                                             (10) 
If bankruptcy never occurs, the average maturity M of debt is  






dtmetM mt                                                       (11) 
Therefore, the average debt maturity M  varies inversely with the debt “rollover rate” m.  
As discussed by Leland (1998), this constant rollover structure can be viewed as a 
sinking fund that continuously retires outstanding debt at par.   
 As in Leland (1994), shareholders service debt entirely as long as the firm is 
solvent. If the firm’s cash flows are insufficient to meet debt payments, shareholders 
inject capital by issuing additional equity. Bankruptcy occurs endogenously when the 
value of equity falls to zero so that it is no longer optimal for shareholders to service debt. 
The control of the firm transfers to bondholders after bankruptcy. 
2.3.3 The Debt Value Process 
By the theory of contingent claims valuation, the market value of debt is the 
discounted risk-neutral expectation of cash flows to bondholders where the discounting is 
at the risk-free rate (see Duffie 2001). By (6), we can show that the value of debt issued 
at t=0, denoted by D0(V,t) satisfies the following partial differential equation(PDE):  
( ) ( ) 0
2
1 000022 =+++−−+ − mPCeDrDVDrDV mttVVV δσ                            (12) 
where subscripts indicate partial derivatives.  As discussed in Leland (1998), although the 
value of debt issued at date 0=t  is explicitly time-dependent, the value of total 
outstanding debt at any date depends only on the value of the state variable V . If D(V) 
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denote the value process of total outstanding debt at any date , we have D0(V,t)=e-mtD(V).  
From (10), we have that D(V) satisfies the following ordinary differential equation 
(ODE): 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
2
1 22 =+++−−+ mPCDmrVDrDV VVV δσ                                (13) 
The above ODE has a general solution of the form: 





VD 21                                                (14) 






















































=−                               (16)  
Since r and m are positive, it follows that 0,0 <> −+ ηη .  The constant A2 must be zero to 







VD                                                    (17) 
The debt value satisfies three additional conditions.  Since debt is issued at par at date 
zero: 
PVD =))0((                                                          (18) 
The value of debt at bankruptcy is equal to firm value since absolute priority is enforced 
at bankruptcy: 
     BB VVD =)(         (19) 
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Finally, we have the smooth pasting condition signifying that bankruptcy is optimally 
declared by shareholders. 
( ) 0| =′ = BVVVE                                                         (20) 
For a given capital structure ),,( mCP , the following result describes the 
relationships between firm value, the debt principal, the coupon, and rollover rate, and 
the endogenous bankruptcy level. 
Proposition 1:  The initial firm value )0(V ,  endogenous bankruptcy level VB , the debt 
principal P, the rollover rate m,  and the coupon rate, C, satisfy the following system of 
equations: 
       ( ) −−−= ηη 1
1
AVB                                                   
(21) 
( ) ( )
























A                                                        (23) 
Proof: see Appendix B. 
 Remark:  Note that, since initial debt is issued at par, the debt principal P , coupon C , 
and retirement rate m are not independent of each other.  
2.3.4 The Owner-Manager’s Objective 
Owing to the manager’s equity stake in the firm given by (7), she receives a 
proportion of its payout flows over time.  The manager also derives control benefits at 
each date that are a proportion ε  of the payout flow to equity-holders. The self-interested 
owner-manager is undiversified due to her controlling ownership stake in the firm, 
control benefits, significant human capital investment in the firm, and the fact that her 
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income over time is tied to the firm so that her objective differs in general from value-
maximization (Zingales, 2000). 
As in studies such as DeMarzo and Fishman (2003) and Biais et al (2004), the 
manager has time-additive linear preferences with a subjective discount rate β .  The 
discount rate β  can be interpreted as the maximum expected return that the manager 
could obtain through outside investments and could also be viewed as her “degree of 
myopia”. The manager chooses the firm’s capital structure ),,( mCP  to maximize her 
discounted expected stream of payoffs from her control benefits and her undiversified 
equity stake in the firm. 
Since the firm continuously retires a fraction of its debt at par and replaces it with 
new debt, the cash outflow (per unit time) to debt holders at any instant is mPC + . Hence 
the cash flow to shareholders (per unit time) is the total payout rate Vδ plus the cash 
inflow rate from issuing new debt ),( tVmD , minus the cash outflow rate to the debt 
holders. The owner-manager receives a fraction, )(Pf  (given by (15)) of the total cash 
flows to the shareholders. As in Leland (1998), we also introduce a re-issuance cost for 
replacing old debt, denoted by k.  The re-issuance cost does not affect our results 
qualitatively, but is a parameter of the model that can potentially be calibrated to actual 
leverage and debt maturity data.  
Hence, for a given capital structure ),,( mCP the owner-manager’s payoff (per unit 
time) at any date t  when the firm is solvent is given by 
( ) ( ) [ ]( )( ) ( ) [ ]( )( )mPkCtVmDVPfmPkCtVmDVtCF mCPmCPmCP ++−++++−+= 1,)(1, ,,,,,, δδε
        (30)                                   
where the subscripts indicate the dependence of the cash flows on the firm’s capital 
structure. The first term on the right hand side of (30) represents the manager’s control 
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benefits (recall that they are a proportion ε  of the payout to equity-holders) while the 
second term represents the manager’s payoff from her ownership stake f . )(,, tD mCP  is 
the debt value at date t  with the subscripts indicating its dependence on the firm’s capital 
structure.  

















β                                                   (25) 
in which mCP ,,τ  is the (stopping) time at which bankruptcy occurs when the capital 
structure is ),,( mCP , and β is the manager’s subjective discount rate.  
2.3.5 The Owner-manager’s Value Function and Optimal Capital Structure  











β                                         (26) 
The subscripts on the value function, the bankruptcy time, and the manager’s cash flows 
explicitly indicate their dependence on the firm’s capital structure. The manager’s 
objective is to choose the firm’s capital structure ),,( *** mCP  to solve 
                             mCPmCP UmCP ,,,,
*** maxarg),,( =                              (27) 
We solve (27) by first deriving the manager’s value function for a given capital structure 
given by (25). Using well-known dynamic programming arguments (see Fleming and 
Soner p.140), we can show that the manager’s value function (where we have dropped 
the subscripts denoting its dependence on the capital structure to simplify the notation) 
must satisfy  
( )( )mPkCPfVmDPfVPfVUUVU VVV +++−++++−+= 1))(()())(())(()(2
1 22 εεεδµσβ                          
(28) 
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where f is the manager’s equity stake given by (7). 
Proposition 2: The solution of the ordinary differential equation (28) has the functional 
form: 





























































































The coefficient B in (29) is determined by the boundary condition U(VB)=0, i.e. 
manager’s value function equals to zero when the firm is bankrupt. 
Proof: see Appendix B 
Although we can analytically characterize the manager’s value function U, we are 
unable to solve the “optimal capital structure” problem (27) analytically. We, therefore, 
use numerical methods (described in Appendix B) to solve (27).  By the result of 
Proposition 1 (see 21 ,22, 23), the principal, the coupon rate, and the rollover rate are not 
independent of each other. Therefore, in our numerical algorithm, we determine the 
principal amount and rollover rate )m,P( **  and then deduce the corresponding coupon 
rate *C  from (22).  Since debt is issued at par, the principal *P is the amount that is 





2.4. The Manager’s Leverage and Debt Maturity Choices 
We solve (27) numerically to derive the manager’s choice of capital structure. We 
describe our numerical procedure in detail in Appendix B.  The tables in this section 
report the numerical results for different choices of the model parameters. When the 
principal amount P is close to zero, we interpret it as an “all-equity” capital structure2. 
When the principal is equal to the initial investment I , it indicates that the manager 
prefers all-debt financing. 
We choose baseline values for the model parameters and examine several 
“comparative statics” by varying parameters about their baseline values.  As in Leland 
(1998), the baseline values for the risk-free rate r  and the payout ratio δ  are set to 0.06 
and 0.05, respectively.  The drift µ  and volatility σ  are set to their median values in our 
sample of financing data (see Chapter 3: Empirical Analysis). The managerial discount 
rate is not observable. We choose the baseline rate to be 0.3, which is reasonably higher 
than the historical market returns for well-diversified investors. The re-issuance cost is 
set to 1%. Ritter et al (1996) report that the cost of issuance of a bond is between 1%  and 
2% of the principal. 
2.4.1. Comparative Statics with Drift  
Table 2 reports the variation of leverage, debt maturity, the coupon rate and the 
yield spread with the drift  µ  with all other parameters set to their baseline values. The 
drift µ ranges from 0.01 to 0.28, which are (roughly) the 12.5 and 87.5 percentiles of the 
sample distribution of drifts from the data for our subsequent empirical analysis (see 
                                                 
2 We categorize the financing choice with leverage below 1% as all-equity financing.   
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Chapter 3: Empirical Analysis).  In the “instrument” column, “All-equity” signifies that 
the  
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Table 2: Comparative Statics for Optimal Capital Structure and Debt Maturity 
with Changing Drifts 
 
Initial asset value is normalized to 100, initial investment is 90, risk free rate is 0.06, 
payout ratio is 0.05, asset volatility is 0.3, manager’s discount rate is 0.3. If the optimal 
maturity approaches infinity, we indicate it as a “Consol” bond. 
 
 
Drift  Maturity  Coupon  Instrument Debt Prop.  Yield Spread  
0.01 N/A N/A All-equity 0.00 N/A 
0.02 N/A N/A All-equity 0.00 N/A 
0.03 N/A N/A All-equity 0.00 N/A 
0.04 N/A N/A All-equity 0.00 N/A 
0.05 N/A N/A All-equity 0.00 N/A 
0.06 N/A N/A All-equity 0.00 N/A 
0.07 N/A N/A All-equity 0.00 N/A 
0.08 N/A N/A All-equity 0.00 N/A 
0.09 N/A N/A All-equity 0.00 N/A 
0.10 N/A N/A All-equity 0.00 N/A 
0.11 16.67 0.43 Both 0.07 0.08% 
0.12 9.09 0.92 Both 0.15 0.15% 
0.13 6.67 1.44 Both 0.23 0.25% 
0.14 5.26 1.98 Both 0.31 0.37% 
0.15 4.35 2.55 Both 0.39 0.55% 
0.16 4.00 3.20 All-debt 0.47 0.82% 
0.17 3.70 3.95 All-debt 0.55 1.19% 
0.18 3.85 5.00 All-debt 0.64 1.81% 
0.19 4.35 6.50 All-debt 0.74 2.78% 
0.20 9.09 9.03 All-debt 0.87 4.38% 
0.21 16.67 9.51 All-debt 0.90 4.57% 
0.22 20.00 9.43 All-debt 0.90 4.47% 
0.23 25.00 9.34 All-debt 0.90 4.38% 
0.24 consol 9.24 All-debt 0.90 4.27% 
0.25 consol 9.14 All-debt 0.90 4.16% 
0.26 consol 9.03 All-debt 0.90 4.03% 
0.27 consol 9.03 All-debt 0.90 4.03% 
0.28 consol 9.03 All-debt 0.90 4.03% 



























































Figure 4: Yield Spreads with Changing Project Drifts 
Parameters: V0=100, I=90,  r=0.06,  δ=0.05, σ=0.3, β=0.3 
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manager chooses to finance the project entirely with equity; “All-debt” means that the  
optimal choice is all-debt financing; and “both” means that both debt and equity are 
issued. If the debt maturity exceeds 40 years, it is classified as a “Consol” bond. 
Variation of Leverage with Drift 
From Table 2, we see that the manager chooses all-equity financing for 11.0<µ , 
issues debt and equity for [ ]15.0,11.0∈µ , and chooses all-debt financing for µ > 0.15.  
All our simulations with differing choices of parameter values (not reported for brevity) 
lead to similar qualitative results; that is, there exist two trigger levels of the project drift 
such that the manager chooses all-equity financing below the lower trigger, all-debt 
financing above the higher trigger, and a combination of debt and equity between the 
triggers. 
The intuition underlying these results is based on five important observations. 
1. Since the initial market value )0(V  of the project and its NPV IV −)0(  are fixed, 
it follows from (6) that the manager’s equity stake increases with the amount of 
money P  raised through debt financing (recall that debt is initially issued at par 
so that P  is also the debt principal). 
2. In our “perfect information” world with rational expectations, the amount of 
money raised through debt financing equals the market value of debt at date zero.  
3. By the theory of contingent claims valuation, the market value of debt is the 
discounted risk-neutral expectation of cash flows to bondholders where the 
discounting is at the risk-free rate.  It follows from (14) and (15) that, for a given 
debt structure ),,( mCP does not depend on the parameter µ .  
4. Further, by (14), (19), (20), (21), the bankruptcy level for a given debt structure 
),,( mCP  also does not depend on the parameter µ . Since the bankruptcy level 
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does not depend on µ , it follows from (5) that the probability of bankruptcy 
decreases with µ . 
5. For a given debt structure ),,( mCP  it follows from (5), (6), (22), and (23), that the 
utility-maximizing manager’s discounted expected utility increases with µ , that is, 
her subjective valuation of the firm increases with µ .   
The manager’s optimal choice of capital structure trades off the beneficial effect 
of raising the level of debt through the increase in her equity stake with the detrimental 
effect of increasing the probability of bankruptcy.  If the project drift is below a 
threshold, the manager resorts to all-equity financing due to the very high probability of 
bankruptcy with any nonzero level of debt. As the project drift increases and the 
probability of future bankruptcy declines, however, the manager issues more debt so that 
she can increase her equity stake in the firm thereby increasing her expected utility. 
Beyond a threshold value of the project drift, the manager resorts to all-debt financing so 
that her equity stake in the firm is maximized. 
Variation of Debt Maturity with Drift 
Next, we examine the variation of debt maturity with project drift. From Table 2, 
we see that debt maturity declines with the project drift when it is less than 0.11 and 
increases with the project drift when it exceeds 0.11. These results, which are 
qualitatively robust for different choices of underlying parameter values, suggest that 
debt maturity varies in a non-monotonic U-shape manner with the project drift.  
The intuition for these results hinges on the fact that shorter maturity debt has two 
opposing effects on the manager’s discounted expected utility, ceteris paribus. On the 
one hand, the manager may refinance the firm’s debt at more favorable terms if future 
realizations of the firm value are high (recall that new debt is issued at its market value 
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and that the market value of the firm’s debt depends on the current firm value V , its risk-
neutral drift δ−r and volatility σ ). On the other hand, for the same leverage level, 
shorter maturity debt increases the probability of bankruptcy in the near term since 
principal and interest payments are larger. For lower values of the project drift where the 
manager chooses nonzero leverage, the second effect predominates so that the manager 
issues longer maturity debt. As the project drift increases, the probability that the 
manager can refinance the debt at more favorable terms due to good project realization 
increases so that the debt maturity declines. However, as the project drift further 
increases, the leverage increases substantially as well, thereby increasing the probability 
of bankruptcy, ceteris paribus. Beyond a threshold value of the drift, the manager, 
therefore, chooses longer-maturity debt. 
Our results regarding the variation of debt maturity for lower values of the project 
drift are generally consistent with existing empirical evidence that debt maturity declines 
as project quality improves (see for example, Barclay and Smith(1995), Stohs and Mauer 
(1996), etc.). In addition, our results reconcile several other empirical findings that are 
not completely consistent with predictions of earlier models such as Flannery (1986) and 
Diamond (1991).  Guedes and Opler (1996) find that “fully 99 percent of debt issues with 
a term to maturity of 30 years or more are made by investment grade firms”. They also 
find that investment grade firms are more likely to issue long-term debt.  Our results also 
shed light on the findings of Mitchell (1991, 1993) who documents a negative relation 
between the odds of issuing short-term debt and ex post project quality. She measures ex 
post project quality using the variable ‘NOIG’, the two-year change in annual net 
operating income measured from the year before the bond issue to the year following the 
issue and normalized by annual sales.  These findings are not consistent with Diamond’s 
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(1991) prediction that high quality firms issue short-term debt. Furthermore, Guedes and 
Opler (1996) do not find substantial variation by maturity in pre-issue and post-issue 
stock returns and conclude that “it appears difficult to argue that the debt maturity choice 
is primarily driven by exploitation of information asymmetry or by signaling.” The 
positive implications of our “perfect information” framework suggest that information 
asymmetries may not play an important role in debt maturity choices. 
Our predictions that, beyond a threshold value of the project drift, leverage as 
well as debt maturity increase monotonically are also consistent with the findings of 
Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer(1996), and Johnson (2003). Barclay and 
Smith (1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996) document that firms with longer maturity debt 
also have higher leverage levels. Johnson (2003) documents that the proportion of short 
maturity debt decreases as firms’ leverage increases. 
The variations of leverage and debt maturity with the expected growth of firm 
value are, to the best of our knowledge, novel predictions of our theory.  As the market 
values of the firm and equity depend on the risk-neutral drift of firm value, and not its 
actual drift, these predictions cannot be obtained in traditional contingent claims models 
where financing choices are made by diversified value-maximizing shareholders a(for 
example, Fischer et al 1989, Leland and Toft 1996). In our empirical analysis in Chapter 
3, we find significant support for these predictions of our theory. 
Variation of Yield Spreads with Drift 
 Finally, Table 2 shows that our model generates significant yield spreads. The 
yield spread generally increases with the leverage level. Compared to some traditional 
contingent claim models (see Merton(1974), Longstaff and Schwartz(1995), Leland and 
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Toft(1996), Leland(1998)), the predicted yield spreads,  with range from 8 bps to nearly 
457 bps, are broadly in line with those observed in reality. 
Broadly, our results and the intuition underlying them emphasize the important 
role played by the fact that financing choices are made by an owner-manager with a long-
term objective function, that is, her leverage and debt maturity choices rationally 
incorporate their effect on her stream of future payoffs.  Our results regarding the 
variation of leverage and debt maturity with project drift help to reconcile several 
empirical findings that are not completely consistent with earlier theories of debt 
maturity. 
2.4.2 Comparative Statics with Volatility  
Next, we examine the variation of leverage and debt maturity with the firm 
volatility σ. Table 3 reports the optimal debt maturity and leverage with volatility σ  
ranging from 0.2 to 0.55, which are (roughly) the 12.5 and 87.5 percentiles of the sample 
distribution of volatilities from the data for our subsequent empirical analysis (see chapter 
3,  Table 6 and 9).  
From the Table 3, we see that, the manager’s choice of leverage decreases 
monotonically with the project (firm) volatility.  The intuition for these results is that, as 
the project volatility increases, ceteris paribus, the higher probability of bankruptcy leads 
the manager to choose lower leverage levels. These results are consistent with the 
findings of a number of empirical studies that document a negative relationship between 
leverage and the firm risk (Bradley et al 1984, Friend and Hasbrouck 1988, and Friend 
and Lang 1988).   
Table 3 also demonstrates that debt maturity declines monotonically with the 
project volatility in the range where the manager issues debt.  Higher volatility increases  
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Table 3: Comparative Statics for Optimal Capital Structure and Debt Maturity 
with Changing Volatilities 
 
Initial asset value is normalized to 100, initial investment is 90, risk free rate is 0.06, 
payout ratio is 0.05, asset drift is 0.15, manager’s discount rate is 0.3. If the optimal 
maturity approaches infinity, we indicate it as a “Consol” bond. 
Volatility Maturity  Coupon  Instrument Debt Prop.  Yield Spread  
0.20 7.69 4.74 Both 0.69 0.87% 
0.21 7.14 4.52 Both 0.66 0.85% 
0.22 6.67 4.21 Both 0.62 0.78% 
0.23 6.25 3.99 Both 0.59 0.76% 
0.24 5.88 3.77 Both 0.56 0.73% 
0.25 5.56 3.55 Both 0.53 0.70% 
0.26 5.26 3.33 Both 0.50 0.67% 
0.27 5.00 3.12 Both 0.47 0.63% 
0.28 4.76 2.90 Both 0.44 0.59% 
0.29 4.55 2.69 Both 0.41 0.56% 
0.30 4.35 2.55 Both 0.39 0.55% 
0.31 4.35 2.42 Both 0.37 0.55% 
0.32 4.17 2.21 Both 0.34 0.50% 
0.33 4.00 2.07 Both 0.32 0.48% 
0.34 4.00 1.94 Both 0.30 0.48% 
0.35 3.85 1.81 Both 0.28 0.45% 
0.36 3.70 1.74 Both 0.27 0.46% 
0.37 3.70 1.61 Both 0.25 0.45% 
0.38 3.57 1.48 Both 0.23 0.42% 
0.39 3.45 1.41 Both 0.22 0.42% 
0.40 3.45 1.28 Both 0.20 0.39% 
0.41 3.33 1.21 Both 0.19 0.39% 
0.42 3.23 1.15 Both 0.18 0.39% 
0.43 3.23 1.09 Both 0.17 0.39% 
0.44 3.23 0.95 Both 0.15 0.36% 
0.45 3.13 0.89 Both 0.14 0.34% 
0.46 3.13 0.82 Both 0.13 0.34% 
0.47 3.03 0.76 Both 0.12 0.33% 
0.48 2.94 0.76 Both 0.12 0.35% 
0.49 2.94 0.70 Both 0.11 0.34% 
0.50 2.86 0.63 Both 0.10 0.32% 
0.51 2.86 0.57 Both 0.09 0.30% 
0.52 2.86 0.50 Both 0.08 0.29% 
0.53 2.78 0.50 Both 0.08 0.31% 
0.54 2.78 0.44 Both 0.07 0.28% 
0.55 2.63 0.44 Both 0.07 0.29% 
0.56 2.70 0.38 Both 0.06 0.27% 






















































Figure 7: Yield Spreads with Changing Project Volatilities 
 
Parameters: V0=100,  I=90,  r=0.06,  δ=0.05, µ=0.15, β=0.3 
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the probability of refinancing the firm’s debt at more favorable terms in the future due to 
high project value realizations. As project volatility increases, the decline of the firm’s 
leverage implies that the relative benefits of future favorable refinancing outweigh the 
costs from the increased possibility of financial distress under short-term financing. 
Therefore we observe that the debt maturity declines as the project volatility increases. 
This prediction is consistent with the findings of Stohs and Mauer (1996) who document 
a significant negative relation between debt maturity and earnings variability. In Chapter 
3: Empirical Analysis, we document significant empirical support for the predictions of 
our model regarding the variations of leverage and debt maturity with volatility. 
From Table 3, we see that the yield spread generally decreases with the debt 
maturity (and leverage). These predictions are consistent with the findings of Mitchell 
(1993) who documents a negative relationship between debt maturity and credit spreads. 
Table 4 demonstrates the variation of debt maturity, coupon rate and leverage 
with drift and volatility in a panel form. The chosen values for the other parameters are 
r=0.06, δ=0.05 and β=0.3.  We display the results for volatilities equal to 0.25 and 0.35. 
We can see that the pattern in Table 4 is qualitatively identical to Table 2. Table 5 
demonstrates the effect of changing project volatility with different drift on the optimal 
debt maturity, coupon rate and optimal leverage in a panel form.  Similarly, we choose to 
present the cases with drifts equal 0.12, 0.18, which are approximately the mean and 
median drifts of our empirical samples. The results with other parameters exhibit a 
similar pattern. If the project drift is sufficiently high, the manager prefers all-debt 
financing when the volatility is below a threshold. For example, in the case of µ=0.18, the 
manager chooses all-debt when σ is below 0.23. It is not surprising to observe that the  
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Table 4: Comparative Statics for Optimal Capital Structure and Debt Maturity 
with Changing Drifts and Different Volatilities 
 
Initial asset value is normalized to 100, initial investment is 90, risk free rate is 0.06, 
payout ratio is 0.05, managerial discount rate is 0.3. If the optimal maturity approaches 
infinity, we indicate it as a “Consol” bond. 
 
 
                
   
Volatility 
0.25    
Volatility 
0.35  
Drift  Maturity  Coupon  Debt Prop.   Maturity  Coupon  Debt Prop. 
0.01 N/A N/A 0.00  N/A N/A 0.00 
0.02 N/A N/A 0.00  N/A N/A 0.00 
0.03 N/A N/A 0.00  N/A N/A 0.00 
0.04 N/A N/A 0.00  N/A N/A 0.00 
0.05 N/A N/A 0.00  N/A N/A 0.00 
0.06 N/A N/A 0.00  N/A N/A 0.00 
0.07 N/A N/A 0.00  N/A N/A 0.00 
0.08 N/A N/A 0.00  N/A N/A 0.00 
0.09 N/A N/A 0.00  N/A N/A 0.00 
0.10 N/A N/A 0.00  N/A N/A 0.00 
0.11 20.00 0.79 0.13  14.29 0.18 0.03 
0.12 11.11 1.48 0.24  7.69 0.55 0.09 
0.13 7.69 2.13 0.34  5.56 0.93 0.15 
0.14 6.25 2.84 0.44  4.55 1.39 0.22 
0.15 5.56 3.55 0.53  3.85 1.81 0.28 
0.16 5.00 4.28 0.61  3.45 2.33 0.35 
0.17 5.26 5.41 0.71  3.13 3.00 0.43 
0.18 7.14 6.88 0.81  2.94 3.79 0.51 
0.19 16.67 8.41 0.90  2.94 4.76 0.59 
0.20 14.29 8.46 0.90  3.33 6.52 0.70 
0.21 14.29 8.46 0.90  5.26 9.10 0.82 
0.22 14.29 8.46 0.90  16.67 10.74 0.90 
0.23 16.67 8.41 0.90  25.00 10.52 0.90 
0.24 16.67 8.41 0.90  consol 10.28 0.90 
0.25 20.00 8.34 0.90  consol 10.14 0.90 
0.26 25.00 8.28 0.90  consol 10.14 0.90 
0.27 25.00 8.28 0.90  consol 10.14 0.90 
0.28 33.33 8.20 0.90  consol 10.14 0.90 















































Figure 9: Optimal Maturity with Changing Project Drifts 
Parameters: V0=100,  I=90,  r=0.06,  δ=0.05, β=0.3 
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range of drifts for all-debt financing is larger when the project volatility is lower. The 
uncertainty associated with higher volatility deters the manager from choosing high 
leverage for a wider range of project drifts. 
The results of Tables 2-5 clearly demonstrate the significant impact of the 
project’s actual drift or expected growth rate on the manager’s financing choices. As 
mentioned earlier, this feature of our framework differs significantly from traditional 
“contingent claims” models that assume that the manager behaves in the interests of 
market value maximizing (original or current) shareholders (for example, Merton 1973, 
Fischer et al 1989, Leland 1994). In these models, financing choices only depend on the 
risk-neutral drift of the project. Hence, the fact that the utility-maximizing owner-
manager makes financing choices in our model allows us to understand a large number of 
empirical findings regarding the relationships between leverage, debt maturity, and ex 
post project quality that depends on the drift or growth of firm value as well as its 
volatility.  
2.4.3 Comparative Statics with Respect to the Manager’s Discount Rate β 
Figure 12-14 reports the comparative statics of the manager’s subjective discount 
rate or “degree of myopia”. Since a manager’s “degree of myopia” is unobservable, it is 
difficult to compare these results with empirical findings.  Our results, however, are 
consistent with intuitive arguments. From Figure 12, we see that the manager’s choice of 
leverage declines monotonically with her discount rate, ceteris paribus.  When the 
manager’s discount rate is smaller than 0.21, the manager prefers all debt financing. 
When the discount rate is greater than 0.21, she chooses both debt and equity financing. 
Intuitively, a more myopic manager with a higher subjective discount rate behaves more 
conservatively in her financing decisions.  
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Table 5: Comparative Statics for Optimal Capital Structure and Debt Maturity 
with Changing Volatilities and Different Drifts 
Initial asset value is normalized to 100, initial investment is 90, risk free rate is 0.06, 
payout ratio is 0.05, managerial discount rate is 0.3. If the optimal maturity approaches 
infinity, we indicate it as a “Consol” bond. 
   Drift  0.12    Drift 0.18  
Volatility Maturity  Coupon  Debt Prop.   Maturity  Coupon  Debt Prop. 
0.20 12.50 2.16 0.35  16.67 7.43 0.90 
0.21 12.50 1.98 0.32  16.67 7.61 0.90 
0.22 12.50 1.79 0.29  20.00 7.75 0.90 
0.23 11.11 1.67 0.27  16.67 7.80 0.89 
0.24 11.11 1.48 0.24  10.00 7.36 0.85 
0.25 10.00 1.35 0.22  7.14 6.88 0.81 
0.26 10.00 1.23 0.20  5.88 6.40 0.77 
0.27 10.00 1.11 0.18  5.00 6.07 0.74 
0.28 9.09 1.05 0.17  4.55 5.61 0.70 
0.29 9.09 0.92 0.15  4.17 5.30 0.67 
0.30 8.33 0.86 0.14  3.85 5.00 0.64 
0.31 8.33 0.80 0.13  3.57 4.70 0.61 
0.32 8.33 0.68 0.11  3.33 4.41 0.58 
0.33 7.69 0.61 0.10  3.23 4.24 0.56 
0.34 7.69 0.55 0.09  3.03 3.96 0.53 
0.35 7.69 0.49 0.08  2.94 3.79 0.51 
0.36 7.14 0.49 0.08  2.86 3.52 0.48 
0.37 7.14 0.43 0.07  2.70 3.35 0.46 
0.38 7.14 0.37 0.06  2.63 3.19 0.44 
0.39 7.14 0.31 0.05  2.56 3.03 0.42 
0.40 6.67 0.31 0.05  2.50 2.87 0.40 
0.41 6.67 0.24 0.04  2.44 2.71 0.38 
0.42 6.25 0.24 0.04  2.38 2.55 0.36 
0.43 6.67 0.18 0.03  2.33 2.39 0.34 
0.44 6.25 0.18 0.03  2.27 2.24 0.32 
0.45 5.88 0.18 0.03  2.22 2.17 0.31 
0.46 6.67 0.12 0.02  2.17 2.01 0.29 
0.47 6.25 0.12 0.02  2.13 1.86 0.27 
0.48 5.88 0.12 0.02  2.08 1.79 0.26 
0.49 5.56 0.12 0.02  2.04 1.72 0.25 
0.50 5.26 0.12 0.02  2.04 1.57 0.23 
0.51 6.25 0.06 0.01  2.00 1.50 0.22 
0.52 5.88 0.06 0.01  1.96 1.43 0.21 
0.53 5.56 0.06 0.01  1.92 1.36 0.20 
0.54 5.26 0.06 0.01  1.89 1.28 0.19 
0.55 5.26 0.05 0.01  1.85 1.21 0.18 
0.56 5.26 0.04 0.01  1.82 1.14 0.17 
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Figure 11: Optimal Leverage with Changing Project Volatilities 




2.4.4 Comparative Statics with Respect to Payout Ratio δ 
Figure 15-17 reports the comparative statics with regard to the payout ratio δ. The 
manager’s choice of leverage increases monotonically with the payout ratio, ceteris 
paribus. The intuition for these results is that, as the payout ratio increases, the total 
payout to all claimants, including the manager, increases. Therefore, for the same 
leverage level, the manager’s discounted expected utility increases. The effect of the 
manager’s personal costs due to bankruptcy, therefore, declines so that the manager is 
more willing to take on higher levels of debt.  
2.4.5 Comparative Statics with Respect to Risk Free Rate R 
Figure 18-20 shows the comparative statics with respect to the risk free rate R. 
The risk free rate ranges from 1% to 8% with a step of a quarter of percent. As 
anticipated, we see that debt financing is preferred when the risk free rate is low and 
equity financing is preferred when the risk free rate is high. If R is high, the cost of debt 
financing is high, ceteris paribus, hence the manager prefers equity. If R is low, ceteris 
paribus, low cost of debt induces the manager to issue debt for financing. 
 
2.5. Conclusions 
In this chapter, we develop a continuous-time “perfect information” model to 
examine financing and debt maturity choices by an undiversified, utility-maximizing 
owner-manager. We differ significantly from traditional “contingent claim” models of 
capital structure where financing decisions are made by diversified, value-maximizing 
(original or current) shareholders. In a perfectly competitive market for capital provision 
by outside investors, the owner-manager receives the surplus from the firm’s operations. 





















































Figure 14: Yield Spread with Changing  Managerial Discount Rate 



























































Figure 17: Yield Spread with Changing Payout Ratio  
 




























































Figure 20: Yield Spread with Changing Risk Free Rate 
 
 Parameters: V0=100,  I=90,  β=0.3, µ=0.15, =0.3 
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utility she derives from her entire stream of future cash flows.  We numerically derive the 
manager’s optimal financing policy and examine the comparative static relationships 
between the firm’s leverage, debt maturity, and credit spreads with underlying project 
characteristics. 
We show that leverage increases (decreases) monotonically with the project’s 
drift (volatility). In general, there exist two trigger levels of the project’s drift (volatility) 
such the manager chooses all-equity (all-debt) financing below the lower trigger and all-
debt (all-equity) financing above the higher trigger.  Between the triggers, the firm’s 
capital structure reflects a nonzero proportion of debt and equity. In the region where the 
manager chooses nonzero debt financing, debt maturity declines monotonically with 
project volatility, but varies in a non-monotonic manner with the project’s drift. The 
manager’s choice of leverage decreases monotonically with her subjective discount rate 
or “degree of myopia” and increases monotonically with the project’s payout ratio. For 
reasonable parameter values, the credit spreads on corporate debt predicted by our model 
are significantly higher than those predicted by traditional structural models that do not 
incorporate manager-firm agency conflicts, and closer to those observed in reality.  
Our results help to reconcile several empirical findings that are not consistent with 
earlier models of capital structure and debt maturity.  However, the dynamics of leverage, 
debt maturity, and credit spreads predicted by our analysis suggest that more complex 
functional specifications are probably necessary to empirically estimate the relationships 
between variables. Further, the fact that these variables are endogenously determined 
suggests that a structural approach may be required to examine their relationships. 
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 CHAPTER III   
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
3.1 Introduction 
 In the previous chapter, we develop a unified theoretical framework to examine 
the impact of managerial discretion on firms’ financing and debt maturity choices. Since 
leverage and debt maturity decisions are made by an undiversified, utility-maximizing 
owner-manager rather than market value maximizing shareholders, our model leads to 
novel implications for the relationships between firms’ financing and debt maturity 
choices and the drift and volatility of their asset values. We predict a positive relationship 
between leverage and the drift or ex post expected growth of firm value, and a negative 
relationship between leverage and the volatility of firm value.  Debt maturity varies in a 
U-shaped manner with the drift of firm value, and declines with the volatility of firm 
value. In this chapter, we empirically examine the relationships between firms’ financing 
and debt maturity choices, and the expected growth rates and volatilities of their asset 
values. We document significant empirical support for our theoretical predictions 
regarding these relationships. 
The data for our tests are obtained from the CRSP, COMPUSTAT and FISD 
databases. We use financial reporting data from the COMPUSTAT database to examine 
firms’ financing choices.  We collect firms’ net equity and debt issuance data from cash 
flow statements to calculate the amount of debt financing as a proportion of total external 
financing.  We construct monthly time series of firms’ market asset values using stock 
return data from CRSP and COMPUSTAT balance sheet data, and estimate the volatility 
of firm’s value directly from the monthly time series of asset value. Direct estimation of 
drifts of diffusion process proves to be econometrically extremely challenging and 
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existing time series of financial data appear not long enough to yield reliable 
estimations.3 Instead, we first estimate firms’ equity betas from daily stock returns from 
CRSP. We then calculate firms’ asset betas and use CAPM to calculate the ex ante 
expected return of firms’ total asset. For the tests on debt maturity, we obtain data on the 
maturity structure of publicly issued debt from the FISD database. In addition, we also 
include control variables that are found to be significant determinants in financing and 
debt maturity choices from previous empirical studies. Most of these variables are 
collected from the COMPUSTAT database.  
Our model predicts a positive relationship between leverage and the drift or 
expected ex post growth rate of firm value, and a negative relationship between leverage 
and the volatility of firm value.  We empirically examine the relationships between firms’ 
financing of incremental new investments, and the expected growth rates and volatilities 
of their asset values. By using Tobit analysis, we find that the relation between the 
proportion of debt financing of incremental investments and the ex post expected growth 
rate of firm value is positive and significant, and that the relation between the proportion 
of debt financing and the ex post volatility of firm value is negative and significant. In all 
our tests, we control for the variables that have been identified by previous literature as 
significant determinants of financing choices. In particular, as predicted by our theory, 
leverage varies significantly with the expected ex post growth rate of firm value after 
controlling for the market-to-book ratio, a widely used proxy for firm’s growth 
opportunity. 
Next, we test our hypotheses regarding the relationships between firms’ debt 
maturity choices and the expected ex post growth rate and volatility of firm values.  In 
                                                 
3 Recent advances in estimating drifts of diffusion process with discrete time data, readers are referred to 
for example, Ait-Sahalia(2002). 
 66 
our data sample obtained from the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD), we find 
that the expected growth rates of firm value primarily lie in the region where our theory 
predicts that debt maturity increases with drift.  Using our data sample, therefore, we test 
the hypotheses that the relation between debt maturity and drift is positive, and the 
relation between debt maturity and volatility is negative.  We perform the tests using both 
OLS and panel regressions. We include control variables that have been identified as 
important determinants of debt maturity such as taxes, existing leverage, the Book-to-
Market ratio, asset tangibility, credit rating, profitability, asset maturity and firm size.  
Consistent with our hypotheses, we find a positive and significant relation between debt 
maturity and the ex post expect growth of firm value, and a negative relation between 
debt maturity and the ex post volatility of firm value controlling for all economic 
variables that have been identified by prior literature as important determinants of debt 
maturity.  
We closely mirror our theoretical framework (and those of earlier theoretical 
studies) in our empirical analysis by examining how firms finance incremental 
investments (see also Mayer and Sussman 2004).  Consistent with the findings of Frank 
and Goyal (2003) and Mayer and Sussman (2004), we document that equity financing is 
used more widely than previously thought.  
Following Diamond’s (1991) theoretical study of firms’ debt maturity choices, 
several subsequent empirical studies document a non-monotonic relationship between a 
firm’s credit rating and debt maturity. In Diamond’s “pure debt financing” model, there is 
a one-one correspondence between a firm’s credit rating, and the probability that it 
undertakes a positive NPV project.  Moreover, in his framework, negative NPV projects 
are also necessarily riskier than positive NPV projects.  In our dynamic framework where 
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firms can choose both equity and debt financing, a firm’s default risk (or credit rating) 
depends on the expected growth and volatility of firm value since they determine the 
level as well as the maturity of the firm’s debt.  We empirically examine the relationships 
between a firm’s debt maturity choices and the drift as well as the volatility of its value.  
Therefore, we disentangle the effects of drift and volatility on the quality of a firm’s pool 
of projects instead of using a single, imperfect measure of firm quality such as its credit 
rating.   
In summary, this is the first empirical study (to the best of our knowledge) to 
analyze the relationships between firms’ financing and debt maturity choices and the ex 
post drift and volatility of their asset values. We document significant support for our 
theoretical predictions regarding these relationships. 
 
3.2 Related Literature 
A large part of empirical literature is devoted to explain the leverage of public-
traded firms. In those studies, the dependent variable under scrutiny is the observed level 
of market leverage. However, many theoretical studies on corporate finance aim to 
explain incremental financing behavior for cash-constrained firms. Recently, a series of 
empirical papers are directed to examine firms’ incremental financing choices, which we 
briefly review in the following. 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers(1999) test pecking order theory by checking whether 
changes in debt are a linear function of the financing deficit. If firms follow the pecking 
order for their financing needs, a regression of the issuance of debt on financing deficit 
should have a significant coefficient of one. They document strong support for this 
prediction in a sample of 157 firms from 1971 to 1989. However, Chirinko and 
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Singha(2000) shows that this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the 
pecking order theory to be valid. 
Frank and Goyal(2003) examine a much larger sample with 768 firms from 1971 
to 1998. They show that net equity issues track the financing deficit more closely than do 
net debt issues and financing deficit is less important in explaining net debt issues over 
time for firms of all sizes. Mayer and Sussman(2004) use a filtering technique to identify 
large investment spikes. They find that the spikes are predominantly financed with debt 
by large firms and by new equity by small loss-making firms.  
In the debt maturity literature, existing empirical evidence is inconclusive on 
Diamond’s (1993) model prediction. Mitchell(1991)’s study shows that the odds of 
issuing short term debt is in a negative relation with the ex post project quality, which is 
inconsistent with Diamond’s prediction.  Mitchell (1993) also shows a positive 
relationship between debt maturity and credit quality using the same data source. This 
result suggests that low risk firms have longer maturities than high-risk firms, 
inconsistent with both Flannery’s and Diamond’s models. Barclay and Smith(1995)’s 
study indicates that lower-rated firms issue more long-term debt than higher-rated firms 
and that non-rated firms have more short-term debt. Their evidence suggests a 
nonmonotonic relation between credit rating and debt maturity as predicted by 
Diamond’s model. Guedes and Opler(1996) examines the maturity of incremental debt 
issues rather than the maturity of all liabilities on a firm’s balance sheet. Their main 
finding is that large firms with investment grade credit ratings typically borrow both very 
short term and long term debt, while firms with speculative grade credit ratings borrow 
medium term debt. They also find that smaller and riskier firms rarely issue short-term 
debt and never issue long-term debt. Stohs and Mauer(1996)’s paper tests the maturity 
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hypotheses by computing the weighted average maturity of a firm’s liabilities including 
all debt, debt-like obligations and current liabilities. Their regression shows that firms 
with low-quality ratings tend to lengthen debt maturity structure, but that this trend 
diminishes as credit rating deteriorates, which is supportive of Diamond’s prediction of 
nonmonotonic relation between bond rating and debt maturity. 
 Similarly, empirical research has not provided conclusive support on whether 
signaling and information asymmetries play a crucial role in determining debt maturity 
choices. Barclay and Smith(1995) investigate the relation between debt maturity and ex 
post abnormal earnings. The regression shows statistical significance but not economic 
significance. Stohs and Mauer(1996)’s study confirms Barclay and Smith(1995)’s finding 
that the economic significance of abnormal earnings is negligible: one standard deviation 
increase in abnormal earning reduces debt maturity structure by only 3.5%. Guedes and 
Opler (1996) find no substantial variation by maturity in pre-issue and post-issue stock 
returns. In contrast, Berger et al.(2003) use a unique set of data on bank loans and find 
that information asymmetries appear to affect firms’ maturity choices of bank loans. 
Barclay et al. (2003) argue that previous empirical studies on debt maturity suffer 
from the endogeneity arising from the joint determination of leverage and maturity. 
Johnson(2003) uses simultaneous equations approach to control for endogenous effects. 
He finds strong support for an economically significant attenuation effect of short debt 
maturity on leverage. Datta et al. (2005) document a significant and robust inverse 
relation between managerial ownership and corporate debt maturity, after controlling for 
previously identified determinants of debt maturity and modeling leverage and debt 
maturity as jointly endogenous. Both Johnson and Datta’s paper use the proportion of 
short debt to proxy for firms’ debt maturity.   
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3.3 Empirical Methodology   
     In the previous theory chapters, we presented a unified theory of the financing and 
debt maturity choices of a firm that is controlled by an undiversified utility-maximizing 
owner-manager. It would be ideal to test our model’s implications using a single dataset 
that includes financing and debt maturity data.  Because such a comprehensive database 
is not available, we use data from COMPUSTAT and CRSP to test our hypotheses 
regarding firms’ financing choices. 4  We then use public debt maturity data from FISD 
(Fixed Investment Securities Data) to test our hypotheses regarding firms’ debt maturity 
choices.    
A number of recent studies were directed to investigate the managerial 
compensation and entrenchment with firms’ financing and debt maturity policies. Berger 
et al (1997) show that leverage levels are lower when CEOs do not face pressure from 
either ownership and compensation incentives or active monitoring. Datta et al (2005) 
show that managerial stock ownership plays an important role in determining corporate 
debt maturity. They document a significant and robust inverse relation between 
managerial stock ownership and corporate debt maturity. These studies empirically 
establish a direct link between managerial compensation and firms’ financing and debt 
maturity choices, and confirm that managerial incentives are significant determinants in 
shaping corporate financing policies. Our theoretical model in investigating the impact of 
managerial incentives on corporate financing policy is partly motivated by these robust 
empirical findings. However, in our empirical investigations, we focus on testing the 
relationship between observable firms’ characteristics and their financing policies. 
                                                 
4  COMPUSTAT reports the amount of debt maturing within 2, 3, 4 and 5 years for some firms. However, 
these data are not very helpful to construct the average debt maturity a firm issues in a given year. 
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Therefore, our study adds another dimension, namely, the interplay of firms’ 
characteristics and managerial incentives, to the existing literature. 
The arguments of Barclay, Marx and Smith (2003) on the endogeneity of leverage 
and maturity choices motivate Johnson (2003) and Datta et al. (2005) to use two-stage 
least square regressions in their analyses of firms’ debt maturity choices. These studies 
examine the level and maturity of firms’ existing debt on their balance sheets. In contrast, 
we closely follow our theoretical framework (and most prior theoretical studies) in 
examining how firms finance new investments. In other words, we examine the 
proportion of debt in a firm’s incremental financing choices and the maturity of 
incremental debt issues. 
As shown in the previous chapter, the proportion and maturity of debt in the 
financing of a firm's project are both endogenously determined as functions of the 
fundamental parameters of the model, specifically, the project's market value, the 
required investment or book value, the actual drift, the volatility, the risk-free rate, and 
the payout ratio.  More precisely, 
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In our empirical analysis, we examine incremental leverage and debt maturity choices by 
separately estimating the functions (.)L  and (.)M  above. Since leverage and debt 
maturity are separately estimated, the endogeneity problems arising from the 
simultaneous estimation of the proportion and maturity of total existing debt, which are 
cumulative outcomes of past financing decisions, are avoided (see Barclay et al, 2003). It 
is, therefore, econometrically appropriate to separately estimate these functions. Second, 
the endogeneity problem arises in simultaneously estimating the concurrent leverage 
level and maturity, which are cumulative outcomes of past financing and maturity 
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decisions.  Since our empirical analysis focuses on incremental financing and debt 
maturity choices, this endogeneity problem is not a concern for our study.  
Our theory does not incorporate market frictions such as taxes, transaction costs, 
and informational asymmetries in our model in order to directly focus on the effects of 
managers’ incentives on firms’ financing choices. In our empirical analysis, however, it 
is necessary to control for these variables since they have been identified by earlier 
theoretical and empirical studies as important determinants of firms’ financing choices. 
We discuss these control variables in more detail in the following.  
 
3.4 Empirical Tests on Firms’ Financing Choices 
 Based on our theory, we test the following hypotheses regarding firms’ financing 
choices. 
A. The proportion of debt financing of an investment is positively related to the 
expected ex post growth rate of firm value 
B. The proportion of debt  financing of an investment is negatively related to the ex 
post volatility of firm value 
3.4.1 Data and Empirical Implementation 
 We collect financing data from the COMPUSTAT Industrial Annual North 
America database. Our sample period begins from 1971 when the U.S. started to report 
cash flow statement. The sample period ends in 2000.  As is standard in the empirical 
capital structure literature, we exclude financial firms (SIC 6000 – 6999) and regulated 
utilities (SIC 4900 – 4999). Next, we collect the external financing data: net issuance of 
long-tem debt (data114) and net issuance of common stocks and preferred stocks 








Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Financing Data 
 
Debtfrac  is the dollar proportion of debt financing out of total external financing. Mu is the drift 
of the market value of total assets. Mktlev is the market leverage, computed by book value of total 
liabilities divided by the sum of book value of total liabilities and market capitalization of 
common stocks. B/M is the book-to-market ratio of the value of total assets. Tangibility is the 
ratio of the fixed assets to the book value of total assets. Sigma is the volatility of the market 
value of total assets. Profitability is the operating income before tax and amortization scaled by 





  Mean Median Lower Quartile Upper Quartile Standard Devation 
Debtfrac 0.640 0.895 0.132 1.000 0.415 
Mu 0.188 0.149 0.103 0.225 0.166 
Mktlev 0.407 0.392 0.180 0.611 0.261 
B/M 0.778 0.772 0.481 1.031 0.422 
Tangibility 0.335 0.285 0.150 0.483 0.233 
Sigma 0.358 0.295 0.203 0.447 0.228 
Profit 0.075 0.123 0.052 0.181 0.330 







Table 7: Correlation Matrix for Financing Data 
 
 Debtfrac  is the dollar proportion of debt financing out of total external financing. Mu is the drift 
of the market value of total assets. Mktlev is the market leverage, computed by book value of total 
liabilities divided by the sum of book value of total liabilities and market capitalization of 
common stocks. B/M is the book-to-market ratio of the value of total assets. Tangibility is the 
ratio of the fixed assets to the book value of total assets. Sigma is the volatility of the market 
value of total assets. Profitability is the operating income before tax and amortization scaled by 




 Debtfrac Mu Mktlev B/M Tangibility Sigma Profitability Logasset 
Debtfrac 1.000        
Mu -0.307 1.000       
Mktlev 0.570 -0.352 1.000      
B/M 0.359 -0.287 0.692 1.000     
Tangibility 0.273 -0.154 0.219 0.171 1.000    
Sigma -0.406 0.839 -0.459 -0.337 -0.221 1.000   
Profitability 0.160 -0.234 0.115 0.137 0.099 -0.287 1.000  
Logasset 0.240 -0.253 0.327 0.219 0.228 -0.396 0.260 1.000 
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fiscal year implies that the firm effectively buys back outstanding securities during that 
year. Since our theory focuses on the financing of new investments, we restrict 
consideration to firm-year samples where the net issuance of equity and debt are both 
nonnegative. The sample formation in this manner focuses our attention on firm-year 
samples that resort to external financing and exclude those who engage in securities buy-
backs.  
We estimate the ex post volatility of firm value by merging CRSP stock return 
data with COMPUSTAT data.  We use CRSP monthly data to calculate the market value 
of common stock. For every firm-year sample, we compute market value of equity by 
multiplying the year-end value of equity (the stock price multiplied by the number of 
shares outstanding) with one plus the holding period return including distributions. As it 
is difficult to estimate the market value of debt because the trading data for corporate 
debt are scarce and unreliable, we follow earlier empirical studies by using the book 
value of reported total liabilities from a firm’s balance sheet as the estimate of the market 
value of debt. For a firm in good financial health, the book value of debt is a reasonable 
approximation for its market value.  We add the book value of debt to the market value of 
equity to compute the market value of the firm.  In this manner, we construct the monthly 
time series of the market value of total assets for all sample firms. 
 We estimate the ex post annual volatility of asset value from the above 
constructed monthly time series. For each firm-year observation, we calculate the returns 
of the monthly market value of total assets for the 36-month period starting from the 
beginning of the following fiscal year. The drift and volatility of firm value are estimated 
as follows: 
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 (1) 
In the above formula, )ln( ASSETV∆ is the average of the logarithm returns of the monthly 
market value of a firm’s total assets over the subsequent three-year period. As a 
robustness check, we also estimate the volatility for a two-year period after the sample 
year. The results with alternative volatility are qualitatively very similar.  
It is an econometric challenge to precisely estimate the drifts of diffusion 
processes with discrete time data. Interested readers are referred to Ait-Sahalia’s (2002) 
seminal paper. Several recent papers extend Ait-Sahalia’s method and provide detailed 
estimation procedure. However, standard errors of drift estimators are invariably high in 
those procedures (see, for example, Li 2006). Direct estimation by MLE from realized 
firm value data may introduce too much noise in the estimator. We therefore use CAPM 
to estimate the ex ante expected growth of firm value.  This approach is also closer to our 
theory that examines the effect of the ex ante expected growth of firm value due to a new 
investment on the manager’s choice of financing the investment.  
First, we employ market model to estimate equity beta. We run regression of daily stock 
excess returns on value-weighted market excess index returns. Throughout this chapter, 
we present the results with ex post three-year estimation period ( using two-year 
estimation period does not change our empirical results ). 5We then calculate the asset 
beta in the following way, adjusting the asset beta with market leverage and the effects of 
debt tax shield: 
     (2) 
                                                 
5 We also use ex ante three-year and six-year daily returns with the sample-year being the middle to 




























in which VDebt  and VEquity are market values of debt and equity, Tc is the statutory 
corporate tax rate, which we choose 34% uniformly. We use the ex post three-year 
average of realized market risk premium and treasury bill rates to proxy for expected 
market risk premium and risk-free rate. The expected annual asset return, R, can be 
calculated by standard CAPM. Thus, the estimate of the drift of firm value is:   




RMU ++=        (3) 
           We calculate the ratio of book value of total liabilities to market value of total 
assets (market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities) as market leverage.  As 
in earlier empirical studies, we use the book-to-market ratio, defined as the book value of 
total assets divided by the market value of total assets, to proxy for the firm’s growth 
opportunities. We also control for the tangibility of the firm’s assets. Tangible assets are 
easy to collateralize thereby reducing the agency costs of debt and increasing firms’ 
incentives to issue debt. We calculate the asset tangibility as the ratio of tangible asset to 
the book value of total assets. We use the logarithm of asset value to proxy for firm size. 
Small firms tend to be more vulnerable to economic shocks than large ones and are, 
therefore, likely to have higher probabilities of financial distress.  In addition, transaction 
costs of recurring debt issuance may be small for large firms compared with small firms. 
Finally, informational asymmetries between insiders in a firm and the capital markets are 
lower for large firms. 
 The tradeoff theory of capital structure highlights the importance of tax shields on 
debt as a crucial determinant of firms’ financing choices. We use several variables to 
proxy for tax effects. We define a dummy variable equal to one for firms with net 
operating loss carryforwards and zero otherwise. Similarly, we define another dummy 
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variable equal to one for firms with investment tax credits and zero otherwise. As an 
alternative, we calculate non-debt tax shields as in Titman and Wessels (1988). Non-debt 
tax shields are calculated from observed federal income tax payments(T), operating 
income(OI), interests payments(i), and the statutory corporate tax rate(TR): NDT = OI – I 
– T/TR. We then scale non-debt tax shields with book value of total assets.  We use the 
operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets to measure the profitability of 
the firm. The profitability measure can also be regarded as a rough proxy for the payout 
ratio in our model.  
3.4.2 Empirical Results 
 Table 6 reports the descriptive statistics: number of observations, mean, standard 
deviation, lower and upper quartile, as well as median for the dependent and explanatory 
variables. We observe that debt plays a dominant role in firms’ financing: Debtfrac, the 
amount of debt financing as a proportion of total external financing, has a mean of 0.64 
and median of 0.895. In fact, nearly a quarter of the firm-year samples issue all-debt for 
financing. The drift of firm value, Mu, has a mean of 0.188 and a median of 0.149. The 
volatility of firms’ asset value, Sigma, has a mean 0.358 and a median of 0.295.  
We report the correlation matrix of independent variables in Table 7. Most pairs 
exhibit fairly low correlations. B/M ratio and market leverage (Mktlev) have a high 
correlation of 0.699, consistent with the existing finding that low B/M ratio firms, 
regarded as firms with high growth opportunities, tend to have less debt in their capital 
structures. As anticipated, volatility is negatively correlated with variables such as asset 




Table 8: Tobit Analysis of Firms’ Financing Choices 
 
Debtfrac  is the dollar proportion of debt financing out of total external financing. Mu is the drift 
of the market value of total assets. Mktlev is the market leverage, computed by book value of total 
liabilities divided by the sum of book value of total liabilities and market capitalization of 
common stocksB/M is the book-to-market ratio of the value of total assets. Tangibility is the ratio 
of the fixed assets to the book value of total assets. Sigma is the volatility of the market value of 
total assets. Profitability is the operating income before tax and amortization scaled by book 
value of total assets.  Logasset is the logarithm of book value of total assets. Losscarry is the 
dummy for operating loss carryforward, taking value of one if loss carryforward is greater than 
zero, and zero otherwise. Invcr  is the dummy for investment tax credit, taking value of one if 
investment tax credit is greater than zero, zero otherwise. Columns (1) to (6) report the estimates 
of coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for different model specifications.  
 
 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept  1.128*** 0.330*** 0.479*** 0.333*** 0.533*** 0.534*** 
  (154.666) (31.924) (38.678) (29.463) (15.045) (15.087) 
Mu  0.402*** 0.179*** 0.356*** 0.150*** 0.119*** 0.122*** 
  (9.647) (4.978) (9.069) (4.178) (3.313) (3.374) 
Mktlev   1.309***  1.430*** 1.427*** 1.427*** 
   (88.543)  (72.754) (72.428) (72.441) 
B/M    0.432*** -0.107*** -0.134*** -0.134*** 
    (47.104) (-9.291) (-11.688) (-11.710) 
Tangibility    0.506***  0.408*** 0.408*** 
    (32.351)  (28.636) (28.672) 
Sigma  -1.490*** -0.627*** -1.064*** -0.557*** -0.493*** -0.494*** 
  (-48.551) (-22.694) (-36.035) (-19.833) (-16.882) (-16.926) 
Profitability     0.136*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 
     (10.855) (9.413) (9.468) 
Logasset      -0.020*** -0.020*** 
      (-11.020) (-11.033) 
Losscarry      0.099*** 0.136*** 
      (14.076) (6.187) 
Invcredit       -0.039* 
       (-1.795) 
        
N   30467 30467 30402 30409 30378 30378 
 
    ***,** and* indicate statistical significance at 1,5,and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Although our data show that a large number of firms raise funds through debt, 
equity financing also plays a significant role in our samples.  In our sample, firms 
exclusively issue equity more than twenty percent of the time (over twenty percent of the 
firm-year observations correspond to pure equity issues).  Over fifty percent of the firm-
year observations correspond to issues of both debt and equity. This evidence is 
consistent with the findings of Frank and Goyal (2003) and Mayer and Sussman (2004).  
Tobit Analysis 
 In our tests on firms’ financing choice, the dependent variable is Debtfrac, the 
amount of debt financing for the firm as a proportion of total external financing for the 
fiscal year. For firms issue only debt or equity in the sample year, the variable Debtfrac 
takes values of one or zero. Since the dependent variable is censored above one and 
below zero, we employ Tobit analysis to test our hypotheses. 
 Table 8 reports the results of Tobit analysis for various model specifications. 
Across all model specifications, the coefficients on Mu, the ex post expected growth rate 
of firm value, are positive and statistically significant at the one percent level, which is 
consistent with our hypothesis A. The coefficients on Sigma, the ex post volatility of 
market asset value are negative and statistically significant at the one percent level, which 
is consistent with our hypothesis B. 6 Moreover, the impact of volatility on firms’ debt 
financing choices is also economically significant. A one standard deviation change in 
the volatility leads to a ten percent change in the proportion of debt financing.  Our 
control variables include proxies for tax shields, firm size, asset tangibility, growth 
opportunities, profitability as well as current leverage. While the negative relation 
between leverage and past earnings volatility has been documented in prior empirical 
                                                 
6 We also use repeated sub-samples to test these hypotheses controlling for firm fixed effects since it is 
computationally extremely cumbersome for the full samples. The results are the same. 
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studies, this paper is the first (to the best of our knowledge) to examine the relation 
between leverage and the ex post expected growth rate and volatility of firm value.   
The estimators for tangible assets show that the firms issue more debt if they have 
more tangible assets, which is consistent with Rajan and Zingales(1995). The B/M ratio, 
a proxy for growth opportunities, is significantly negatively related with debt financing. 
In our sample, firms raise substantial funds from external resources.  The negative 
coefficients indicate that firms with high growth opportunity prefer debt to equity, if they 
do need external financing.  
Market leverage (that is, the existing leverage) is positively related with the 
proportion of debt financing. Profitability, the proxy for profitability, is positively related 
with debt financing, although the magnitude is fairly small. Highly profitable firms prefer 
debt to equity if they are in need of external funds for investment, which is consistent 
with the pecking order theory of capital structure. The coefficient on the tax dummy 
Losscarry is significantly positive. Invcr, the dummy for investment tax credit, has a 
negative sign with only marginal significance. We also run regressions including NDTTA, 
on-debt tax shield scaled by total assets. NDTTA is not statistically significant in almost 
all specifications, although its signs are consistent with Titman and Wessels (1988). 
The Tobit analysis shows strong support for our model predictions on firms’ 
external financing choice with regard to the characteristics of firm value. The signs on 
Mu and Sigma are consistent with our hypotheses, at the one percent statistical 
significance level, after controlling the effects of firm size, growth opportunity, size 




3.5 Empirical Tests on Debt Maturity Choices 
In this subsection, we present the results of empirical tests of the predictions of 
our model that 
   C. Debt maturity varies in a U-shape manner with the ex post expected growth rate of 
firm value. 
    D. Debt maturity is negatively related to the ex post volatility of firm value. 
3.5.1 Data and Empirical Implementation 
We obtain the debt maturity data from the FISD database.  Consistent with earlier 
empirical studies that examine firms’ debt maturity choices, we exclude financial service 
firms (SIC 6000-6999) from our sample. However, we include regulated firms (SIC 
4900-4999) in these tests for two principal reasons. First, the empirical literature on debt 
maturity invariably includes regulated firms. Second, regulated firms constitute a 
considerable portion of the FISD data; they increase our sample size by about 10 percent.  
We include a regulated firm dummy variable in our regression analysis to control for the 
effect of regulation. 
The FISD database contains detailed information on publicly issued debt 
including offering date, maturity date, offering yield, issue type, issue amount, coupon 
information, etc.  For each debt issue, we infer its maturity by the difference between 
issue date and maturity date. However, FISD data does not include domestic commercial 
paper and bank loan data. Many sample firms have multiple public debt issues in a given 
calendar year. We calculate the weighted average maturity for these firm-year samples. 
Hence, in our analysis, the dependent variable is the weighted average maturity of the 
public debt firms issued in a given year. We use both pooled OLS and fixed effect panel 









Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Debt Maturity Data 
 
Myear  is the weighted average debt maturity. Mu is the drift of the market value of total assets. 
Mktlev is the market leverage, computed by book value of total liabilities divided by the sum of 
book value of total liabilities and market capitalization of common stocks. B/M is the book-to-
market ratio of the value of total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of the fixed assets to the book 
value of total assets. Sigma is the volatility of the market value of total assets. Profitability is the 
operating income before tax and amortization scaled by book value of total assets.  Logasset  is 
the logarithm of book value of total assets. Rating is the S&P Long-term Debt Domestic Credit 
Rating, assigned zero is non-rated. Assetmat is gross property, plant and equipment (PPE) divided 
by depreciation expense. 
 
 
  Mean Median Lower Quartile Upper Quartile Standard Devation 
Myear 16.059 10.000 10.000 25.000 11.003 
Mu 0.151 0.126 0.083 0.172 0.222 
Mktlev 0.498 0.496 0.327 0.656 0.219 
B/M 0.779 0.781 0.568 0.978 0.317 
Tangibility 0.431 0.399 0.227 0.631 0.251 
Sigma 0.250 0.201 0.147 0.281 0.212 
Profit 0.129 0.131 0.095 0.171 0.096 
Logasset 21.190 21.207 20.109 22.270 1.597 
Rating 7.554 9.000 0.000 12.000 6.275 








Table 10: Correlation Table for Debt Maturity Data 
 
Myear  is the weighted average debt maturity. Mu is the drift of the market value of total assets. 
Mktlev is the market leverage, computed by book value of total liabilities divided by the sum of 
book value of total liabilities and market capitalization of common stocks. B/M is the book-to-
market ratio of the value of total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of the fixed assets to the book 
value of total assets. Sigma is the volatility of the market value of total assets. Profitability is the 
operating income before tax and amortization scaled by book value of total assets.  Logasset  is 
the logarithm of book value of total assets. Rating is the S&P Long-term Debt Domestic Credit 
Rating, assigned zero is non-rated. Assetmat is gross property, plant and equipment (PPE) divided 
by depreciation expense. 
  
 
  Myear Mu Mktlev B/M Tangibility Sigma Profit Logasset Rating Assetmat 
Myear 1.000          
Mu -0.022 1.000         
Mktlev -0.040 -0.106 1.000        
B/M 0.050 -0.070 0.782 1.000       
Tangibility 0.153 -0.069 0.103 0.153 1.000      
Sigma -0.109 0.797 -0.176 -0.143 -0.204 1.000     
Profit 0.116 -0.040 -0.242 -0.192 0.135 -0.117 1.000    
Logasset 0.101 0.016 -0.020 -0.035 0.086 -0.079 0.141 1.000   
Rating -0.092 -0.029 0.021 0.000 0.074 0.003 0.014 0.268 1.000  
Assetmat 0.161 -0.115 0.149 0.217 0.590 -0.197 -0.048 0.010 0.045 1.000 
 
 85 
not include the data of privately issued debt. Consequently, simple regression on this 
censored data with only public debt will produce inconsistent estimates of explanatory 
variables. To correct this selection bias, we use the maximum likelihood estimator 
(Nawata, 1994) in the spirit of Heckman (1979)’s selection model. We include the 
variables that are statistically significant predictors of the public/private issues in 
MacKie-Mason (1990) to control for the selection bias. 
As in the test on financing choice, we estimate the ex ante expected growth of 
firm value by CAPM and the volatility of firm value of assets from the monthly time 
series of asset value.  As in our earlier tests, we include control variables for market 
leverage, the Book-to-Market ratio, asset tangibility, firm size, profitability, non-debt tax 
shields, investment credit and loss carry-forward dummies. In addition, we add control 
variables that have been identified as important determinants of debt maturity. We now 
describe the computation of these variables. 
 We compute the asset maturity as gross property, plant and equipment (PPE) 
divided by depreciation expense. Myers (1977) argues that firms can match the maturities 
of their assets and liabilities to reduce underinvestment problems. We assign one to the 
dummy (Regulate) for a regulated firm (SIC 4900-4999) and zero otherwise to control for 
the effect of regulation. 
 Brick and Ravid (1985) show that the tax-shields on long-term debt are higher 
when the yield curve is upward sloping.  Therefore, as in Johnson (2003), we also include 
a term structure variable, defined as the 30-year U.S. treasury yield minus the six-month 
U.S. treasury yield (treasury yield data are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank 
website).  
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 We use the S&P domestic long-term debt credit rating extracted from the 
COMPUSTAT database as a measure of the firm’s credit risk. It is a cardinal number 
system, 16 is the highest rating number while 1 is the lowest. For all non-rated firms, we 
assign zero as their credit rating.  
3.5.2.Empirical Results 
Table 9 reports the descriptive statistics for firms in our sample: the number of 
observations, mean, median, standard deviation, lower and upper quartile, for the 
dependent and explanatory variables. The maturity variable, Myear has a mean and a 
median of 10 years. The drift of firms’ asset value, Mu, has a mean of 0.117 and a median 
of 0.085. The volatility of firm value, Sigma, has a mean of 0.265 and a median of 0.203. 
While the mean and median values of Mu correspond closely to the corresponding values 
for the sample of firms used in our earlier tests of firms’ financing choices, the mean and 
median values of Sigma are significantly lower. This suggests that the FISD database 
contains a higher percentage of large and stable firms. We also report the Pearson 
correlation matrix of independent variables in Table 10.  Most pairs of correlation are 
similar to those in our earlier sample. 
OLS Regressions 
 Table 10. Panel A reports the results of pooled OLS regressions for different 
model specifications. The dependent variable is Myear, the value weighted average 
maturity of public debt issued by the firm in a given calendar year. Across all model 
specifications, the coefficients on Mu, the ex post expected growth rate of firm value, are 
positive and statistically significant with p-values below 0.0001. The coefficients on 
Musqr, the square of the drift, are negative but only marginally significant. The 
coefficients of Mu and Musqr suggest that debt maturity attains its maximum when Mu is 
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greater than 5, well outside the range of values of Mu in the sample. The overall 
empirical evidence suggests that debt maturity increases with the drift of firm value. 
Consistent with our hypothesis D, the coefficients on Sigma are negative and significant 
at the one percent level in all specifications. Not only these coefficients are statistically 
significant, they are economically significant as well. An increase by one standard 
deviation in Mu lengthens the debt mature by over two years. Likewise, an decrease by 
one standard deviation in Sigma increases the debt maturity similar magnitude. 
The empirical evidence that debt maturity increases with the drift of firm value is, 
in fact, also consistent with the theory. Table 9 indicates that the values of Mu for a 
majority of firms in the sample are greater than 0.08. Moreover, the sample Mu is skewed 
toward right (higher value of Mu).An examination of Table 6 in the previous chapter 
reveals that debt maturity is likely to increase with drift over this range.  In other words, 
the range of values of firm drifts in our sample corresponds to the “right half” of the 
predicted U-shaped relation between debt maturity and drift. Therefore, as we empirically 
document, debt maturity should increase with drift in this range.  The fact that the FISD 
database includes data on publicly issued debt implies that firms with low drifts do not 
issue public debt to finance their investment needs. This observation, combined with our 
earlier findings that firms with low growth rates are less likely to issue debt, are 
consistent with our theory. 
Debt maturity increases with the Book-to-Market ratio, a proxy for growth 
opportunities, confirming the findings of Johnson (2003) and Guedes and Opler (1996). 
The coefficients on Mktlev are significantly negative indicating that firms with higher 
existing leverage levels choose shorter debt maturities.  The coefficients of Logasset, the 
proxy for firm size, are positive and significant, which is also consistent with Johnson 
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(2003).  The coefficients of Profitability, the proxy for profitability, are positive and 
significant suggesting that more profitable firms issue longer-term debt.  
The coefficient of Regulate, the dummy for regulated firms is positive and 
significant at five percent significant level, supporting Barclay and Smith (1995)’s 
argument that regulated firms can borrow longer-term because with less discretion in 
investment decisions, debt agency problem are less severe. This finding is also consistent 
with Guedes and Opler (1996) and Johnson (2003). The coefficients of asset maturity are 
positive and significant, which is also consistent with existing literature. Myer (1977)’s 
argue that firms can match the maturities of their assets and liabilities to reduce the 
underinvestment problems.  
The coefficient of the tax dummy Invcr are significantly positive, confirming 
Johnson (2003)’s findings. However, NDTTA, non-debt tax shield scaled by total assets, 
and Losscarry, the dummy for operating loss carryforward, are generally not statistically 
significant. We, therefore, do not report them for the sake of brevity. The term structure 
variable is statistically insignificant and we do not report it either. 
Our dataset is an unbalanced panel data with over 45% of sample firms have 
repeated observations. As a robustness check, we also perform fixed effect panel 
regression, reported in Table 11, Panel B. As the table shows, the results are similar to 
those of pooled OLS regressions for most variables. The coefficients of Mu and Musqr 
are close to those reported in Panel A, with similar statistical significance. The coefficient 
of Sigma remains negative as we expect, but with lower statistical significance.  
Heckman Correction 
In previous sub-section, we test our hypothesis on the maturity data of publicly issued 
debt. We do not have maturity information on privately placed debt including bank  
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Table 11: Empirical Analysis of Firms’ Debt Maturity Choices 
Myear  is the weighted average debt maturity. Mu is the drift of the market value of total assets. 
Mktlev is the market leverage, computed by book value of total liabilities divided by the sum of 
book value of total liabilities and market capitalization of common stocks. Tangibility is the ratio 
of the fixed assets to the book value of total assets. Sigma is the volatility of the market value of 
total assets. Profitability is the operating income before tax and amortization scaled by book 
value of total assets.  Logasset  is the logarithm of book value of total assets.. Invcr is the dummy 
for investment tax credit, taking value of one if investment tax credit is greater than zero, and 
zero otherwise. Assetmat is gross property, plant and equipment (PPE) divided by depreciation 
expense. Rating is the S&P Long-term Debt Domestic Credit Rating, assigned zero is non-rated. 
Regulate is the dummy variable, taking value of one if regulated firm, zero otherwise. Columns 
(1) to (4) report the estimates of coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for different model 
specifications. 
  A. Pooled Regression    B.  Fixed Effects  
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept  13.49*** -2.43 N/A N/A 
  (14.35) (-0.84) N/A N/A 
Mu  14.20*** 10.75*** 9.59*** 10.09*** 
  (5.59) (4.33) (3.04) (3.10) 
Musqr  -1.33*** -1.14*** -1.24*** -1.32*** 
  (-4.62) (-3.89) (-3.33) (-3.42) 
Mktlev  -9.78*** -8.21*** -7.80*** -6.86*** 
  (-6.80) (-6.09) (-3.61) (-2.82) 
Sigma  -12.96*** -9.44*** -3.56* -3.33* 
  (-8.80) (-6.63) (-1.63) (-1.50) 
B/M  6.48*** 4.84*** 3.30** 2.93** 
  (5.40) (4.32) (2.31) (1.89) 
Tangibility   0.50***  -4.89** 
   (0.51)  (-1.62) 
Profitability  10.63*** 6.84***  4.97** 
  (4.96) (3.49)  (1.78) 
Logasset   0.79*** -1.62*** -1.67*** 
   (5.75) (-4.95) (-5.15) 
Invcredit   4.36*** 1.27** 1.24** 
   (10.91) (1.95) (1.90) 
Assetmat  0.14*** 0.09***  0.08** 
  (5.88) (3.53)  (1.96) 
Regulate   1.15**  7.84 
   (1.66)  (1.07) 
Rating   -0.16***  -0.08 
   (-6.16)  (-0.38) 
      
Adjusted R2  0.07 0.12 0.20 0.20 
      
N   3154 3153 3198 3153 
***,** and* indicate statistical significance at 1,5,and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 12:Empirical Analysis of Firms’ Debt Maturity Choices with Heckman 
Correction 
Myear  is the weighted average debt maturity. Mu is the drift of the market value of total assets. 
Mktlev is the market leverage, computed by book value of total liabilities divided by the sum of 
book value of total liabilities and market capitalization of common stocks. Tangibility is the ratio 
of the fixed assets to the book value of total assets. Sigma is the volatility of the market value of 
total assets. Profitability is the operating income before tax and amortization scaled by book 
value of total assets.  Logasset  is the logarithm of book value of total assets.. Invcr is the dummy 
for investment tax credit, taking value of one if investment tax credit is greater than zero, and 
zero otherwise. Assetmat is gross property, plant and equipment (PPE) divided by depreciation 
expense. Rating is the S&P Long-term Debt Domestic Credit Rating, assigned zero is non-rated. 
Regulate is the dummy variable, taking value of one if regulated firm, zero otherwise. Columns 
(1) to (2) report the estimates of coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for different model 
specifications. 
        
    (1) (2) 
Intercept  -1.72 -2.42 
  (-0.43) (-0.55) 
Mu  11.26*** 10.60*** 
  (5.41) (5.05) 
Musqr -1.15*** -1.12*** 
  (-3.82) (-3.74) 
Mktlev  -9.12*** -8.62*** 
  (-6.30) (-5.88) 
Sigma  -10.25*** -9.33*** 
  (-4.70) (-3.92) 
B/M  4.87*** 5.02*** 
  (4.73) (4.88) 
Tangibility  0.51 
   (0.53) 
Profitability  6.71*** 
   (3.23) 
Logasset  0.83*** 0.80*** 
  (6.82) (6.52) 
Invcredit  4.67*** 4.37*** 
  (7.38) (6.25) 
Assetmat  0.11*** 0.09*** 
  (5.90) (3.76) 
Regulate   1.17* 
   (1.57) 
Rating  -0.15*** -0.16*** 
  (-4.84) (-5.09) 
Rho  -0.02 -0.009 
  (-0.09) (-0.04) 
N   3159 3153 
***,** and* indicate statistical significance at 1,5,and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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loans, which takes a considerable portion of corporate liabilities. Hence, the dataset may 
be subject to sample selection bias ( Heckman, 1979 ). We implement Nawata (1994)’s 
method to correct for potential sample bias. Nawata (1994) proposes a maximum 
likelihood estimator for standard Heckman selection model, which improves estimation 
efficiencies from two-step method. 
We show the results after the correction of sample selection bias in Table 12. In 
the selection-part estimation, we include the variables that are found to be significant in 
predicting whether firm chooses public or private issuance in Makie-Mason(1990). These 
variables include existing ones Sigma, Losscarry, Invcr, Tangibility, Mktlev, plus 
Dividend, dummy variable of one if the firm paid dividends, RND, research and 
development scaled by total assets, and Advertising, expenditure on advertising scaled by 
total assets.  Our main results still hold after the Heckman correction. The coefficients 
and statistical significance are consistent with previous model specifications without 
Heckman correction. The model parameter Rho is not significant in both specifications, 
which suggests that sample selection bias may not be a problem in our dataset.   
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 We test the predictions of our theory on the impact of managerial incentives on 
the financing and debt maturity choices of firms.  In our empirical analysis, we use 
financial report data from COMPUSTAT, stock return data from CRSP, and debt 
maturity data from FISD.  We examine the relations between the level and maturity of 
debt in a firm’s financing of incremental investments, and the ex post growth rate and 
volatility of its value.  We estimate directly the volatility of firm value by constructing 
monthly time series of firms’ total asset value. We use CAPM to infer the ex ante drift of 
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firm value. In our tests, we include control variables that have been identified as 
important determinants of firms’ financing and debt maturity decisions by previous 
studies, such as firm size, growth opportunity, profitability, tax effects. We perform Tobit 
analysis, OLS and panel regressions in our empirical tests. The empirical results broadly 
support the predictions of our theory regarding the relations between firms’ financing and 




  ANALYSIS OF THE TWO-PERIOD MODEL 
 In this Appendix, we prove Proposition 1.  Because the proof is rather involved, 
we present it in several intermediate steps. We use the following lemma frequently in the 
proof.  








DG  is increasing and strictly convex 
over )/,/inf( βα BAD ∈  if βα // BA > , is decreasing if βα // BA < , and is constant if 
βα // BA = . 
Proof.  The assertions follow directly from differentiating the function G . 
 The following result establishes the optimality of all-equity financing when the 
up-tick probability 5.0≤p . 
Proposition A1:  If 5.0≤p , it is optimal for the owner-manager to choose all-equity 
financing. 
Proof.  The manager’s expected payoff from issuing long-term debt with face value LD  
is given by (5). By (4) the manager’s expected control benefits, described by the first 
term on the right hand side of (5), decrease with LD . Because )1/()1()( LL PIPf −−= , the 
second term can be rewritten as 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ]

























For 5.0≤p , we can use Lemma A1 to show that the above expression decreases with LD  
so that the second term on the right hand side of (5) also decreases with LD . Hence, 
within the class of long-term debt financing, the manager’s expected payoff is maximized 
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when 0=LD , which corresponds to all-equity financing. We can similarly use Lemma 1 
to show that (details omitted for brevity) the manager’s expected payoff from issuing 
short-term debt with face value SD  decreases with SD  for 5.0≤p .    
     Q.E.D. 
 We now analyze the manager’s financing choices in the region 5.0>p . The 
following proposition describes the possible face values of the manager’s optimal (long-
term or short-term) debt choices.  
Proposition A2:  a) If it is optimal for the manager to issue long-term debt, the 
corresponding face value *LD   must belong to the set { }debt all22 ,1,)1( LDuu −−  where 
debt all
LD  is the face value of debt when the manager chooses long-term all-debt financing.  
b)  If it is optimal for the manager to issue short-term debt, the corresponding face value 
*
SD  must belong to the set { }debt all,1 SDu−  where debt allSD  is the face value of debt when the 
manager chooses short-term all-debt financing. 
Proof.  a)    To simplify the exposition, we make the standing assumption that 
2debt all 1 uDL −≥ . The arguments are similar for the case where 
2debt all 1 uDL −< . By (2), (4) 
and the result of Lemma A1, the owner-manager’s expected utility )( LDU from issuing 
long-term debt with face value LD  (given by (5)) is piecewise convex, that is, it is convex 
for ),1((),1,)1((),)1(,0[ debt all2222 LLLL DuDuuDuD −∈−−∈−∈ . It follows that the face 
value *LD  at which the function (.)U  is maximized must be one the boundary points 
{ }debt all22 ,1,)1( LDuu −−  of these intervals. 
b)  We assume that uDS −≥1
debt all  (this, in fact, follows from our assumption that 
2debt all 1 uDL −≥ ; see part a)). By (6), (7), (8), (9), and the result of Lemma A1, the owner-
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manager’s expected utility )( SDU  from issuing short-term debt with face value 
SD (given by (10)) is convex for ),1();1,0[
debt all
SSS DuDuD −∈−∈ . Hence, its optimum 
*
SD  must be one of the boundary points of these intervals.       
  Q.E.D.  
Proposition A2 substantially simplifies the analysis of the owner-manager’s 
optimal financing choice because it is sufficient to restrict consideration to face values of 
debt at the “boundary” points { }debt all22 ,1,)1( LDuu −−  for long-maturity debt and 
{ }debt all,1 SDu−  for short-maturity debt.  In order to simplify the subsequent analysis, we 
assume that 2debt all 1 uDL −≥ .  We can use similar arguments to prove Proposition 1 in the 
case where 2debt all 1 uDL −<  (details available upon request). 
Proposition A3:  a) The manager’s expected payoff from choosing long maturity all debt 
financing equals her expected payoff from choosing short maturity all debt financing.  
b) The manager’s expected payoff from issuing long maturity debt with face value 21 u−  
strictly exceeds her expected payoff from choosing long-term all debt financing.  
Proof.    a)  We begin by noting that the market value of debt in any state is the risk-
neutral expectation of its future payoffs and that the risk-neutral probability of an "up-
tick" in firm value in each period is 0.5 (recall that the risk-free rate is zero).  Since 
2debt all 1 uDL −≥ ,  the market value at date 1 of long-term debt with face value 
debt all
LD  is 
equal to )1(5.05.0 2debt all uDL −+ when firm value is u+1 , and is equal to u−1  when firm 
value is u−1 .  Since the market value of this debt at date 0 must be I  (by 
definition, debt allLD is the face value of debt when the manager chooses all debt financing), 
we must have 
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    ( ) IuuDL =−+−+ )1(5.0)1(5.05.05.0 2debt all             (A1) 
It follows from (A1) that uI −≥1 . Let debt allSD  be the face value of debt when the 
manager chooses short maturity all debt financing. We must have 
    IuDD SS =−+ )1,inf(5.05.0
debt alldebt all              (A2) 
Since uI −≥1 , it follows from (A2) that uDS −≥1
debt all . Comparing (A1) with (A2), it 
then follows that 
    debt all2debt all )1(5.05.0 SL DuD =−+              (A3) 
 By (A3), the face value of re-financed short term debt in period 2 is equal to 
debt all
LD when firm value is u+1 . Since uDS −≥1
debt all , bankruptcy is declared when the 
firm value at date 1 is u−1 . It now follows from (9) and (10) that the manager’s expected 
payoff from issuing short-term debt with face value debt allSD  is identical to her expected 
payoff from issuing long-term debt with face value debt allLD . 
b)  Since 2debt all 1 uDL −≥ ,  it follows from (4) that the owner-manager’s expected control 
benefits (the first term on the right hand side of (5)) are strictly greater when she issues 
long maturity debt with face value 21 u−  than when she chooses all debt financing with 
face value debt allLD . By (1) and (2), the manager’s expected payoff from her equity stake 
in the firm (the second term on the right hand side of (5)) if she issues long-term debt 
with face value ],1[ debt all2 LL DuD −∈ is  












−             (A4) 
By (A4), the owner-manager’s expected payoff from her equity stake in the firm does not 
vary with ],1[ debt all2 LL DuD −∈ .  The result of the proposition, therefore, follows from the 
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fact that her expected control benefits are greater when she chooses 21 uDL −= .           
Q.E.D. 
 By the results of Proposition A3, the manager always prefers to issue long-term 
debt with face value 21 u−  to either long-term or short-term all debt financing.  The 
following result compares the manager’s expected payoff from issuing long maturity debt 
with face value 21 u−  to short-term debt with face value u−1 . 


















.  The manager’s expected payoff from issuing 
short maturity debt with face value u−1  is strictly greater than her expected payoff from 
issuing long maturity debt with face value 21 u−  for '3pp < , and is strictly smaller for 
'3pp > .  
Note:  Since I−<1ε  by assumption, 1'3 <p . 
Proof.   By (6)-(10), we can show that the manager’s expected payoff at date zero from 
issuing short maturity debt with face value u−1  is 




−+=−= ε  (A5) 
By (2) – (5), the manager’s expected payoff at date zero from issuing long maturity debt 
with face value 21 u−  is 
    222 )1(4)()1( pIuupuDU L −++=−= ε   (A6) 
From (A5), (A6), and after some algebraic manipulations,  
[ ] [ ]puIuupuIIuDUuDU LS )1)(1()()1)(1(2)1(4)1()1( 222 −−−−++−−−=−=−−= ε
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.          
Q.E.D. 
 The following proposition compares the manager’s expected payoff from issuing 
long-term debt with face value 2)1( u−  and long-term debt with face value 21 u− .  
Proposition A5:  There exists '3* pp <  (defined in Proposition A4) such that the 
manager’s expected payoff from issuing long maturity debt with face value 21 u−  strictly 
exceeds her expected payoff from issuing long maturity debt with face value 2)1( u−  if 
and only if *pp > . 
Proof.  By (2)-(5), the manager’s expected payoffs at date zero from issuing long 

















































Differentiating the right hand side above with respect to p  and using the fact that 
I−<1ε  by assumption, we can show that ))1(())1(( 22 uUuU −−−  is increasing in p  for 
2/1>p .  Further, we can check that 0))1(())1(( 22 <−−− uUuU  for 2/1=p , and 
0))1(())1(( 22 >−−− uUuU  for 1=p . It follows that there exists )1,2/1(* ∈p  such that the 
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manager’s expected payoff from issuing long maturity debt with face value 21 u−  strictly 
exceeds her expected payoff from issuing long maturity debt with face value 2)1( u−  if 
and only if *pp > . 



















 . To show this, it follows from the 
arguments in the previous paragraph that it suffices to show that 































































The expression on the right hand side is clearly strictly positive for all )1,0(,0 ∈> uε .        
Q.E.D. 
Proposition A6:  There exists '2p  such that the manager’s expected payoff from issuing 
short maturity debt with face value u−1  exceeds her expected payoff from issuing long 
maturity debt with face value 2)1( u−  if and only if '2pp > . 
Proof.  The proof follows using arguments similar to those used to prove Proposition A5 
and is omitted for brevity.  
 By the results of Propositions A4, A5, and A6, the manager’s expected payoff 
from issuing short maturity debt with face value u−1  strictly exceeds her expected 
payoff from issuing long maturity debt with face value 2)1( u−  when '3pp =  It follows 
that '' 32 pp < . The following proposition compares the manager’s expected payoffs from 
 100 
all-equity financing and her payoffs from issuing long-term debt with face values 2)1( u−  
and 21 u− , respectively. 
Proposition A7:  a) There exists )1,5.0('1 ∈p  such that the manager’s expected payoff 
from issuing long maturity debt with face value 2)1( u−  strictly exceeds her expected 
payoff from all equity financing if and only if '1pp > . Further, we have '' 31 pp < (defined 








ε , which is always true if 3/2>u because 0>ε . 
b)  There exists )1,5.0("3 ∈p  such that the manager’s expected payoff from issuing long 
maturity debt with face value 21 u−  strictly exceeds her expected payoff from all equity 
financing if and only if "3pp > . 
Proof.   a) From (2)-(5) and some algebra, we can show that the difference between the 
manager’s expected payoffs from issuing long-term debt with face value 2)1( u−  and all 













The right hand side of (A9) is an increasing function of p .  Further, it is strictly negative 
for 5.0=p  and strictly positive for 1=p . Hence, there exists )1,5.0('1 ∈p  such that the 
manager’s expected payoff from issuing long-maturity debt with face value 2)1( u−  
strictly exceeds her expected payoff from all-equity financing if and only if '1pp > . 







ε .  Because the right hand side 
of (A9) is an increasing function of p , it suffices to show that it is strictly positive for 
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ε .           
b) This is proved using arguments similar to those used in part a); the details are omitted 
for brevity.      
 Q.E.D. 
 Setting )",'min( 311 ppp = , )",'max( 333 ppp = , and )',max( 212 ppp = , it follows 
from the results of Propositions A2 - A7 that the manager chooses 
• all-equity financing for 1pp < , 
• long maturity debt with face value 2)1( u−  for ),( 21 ppp∈   
• short maturity debt with face value )1( u−   for ),( 32 ppp∈  
• long maturity debt with face value 21 u−  for 3pp > . 
We could have 31 pp =  in which case the interval ),( 31 pp  is empty if. If ),( 31 pp  is non-
empty, however, it follows from Remark A1 that the interval ),( 32 pp  is also nonempty.  
Hence, the triggers 321 ,, ppp  satisfy the statements of Proposition 1. 
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APPENDIX B 
ANALYSIS OF CONTINUOUS TIME MODEL 
Proof of Proposition 1  






0                                                        (B.1) 
By the same way, we obtain from the bankruptcy requirement: 




1                                            (B.2) 
From the smooth pasting condition: 
( ) 0=′ = BVVVE |                                                                    (B.3) 
substitute E (V)= V-D(V), we have  
( ) 1=′ = BVVVD |                                                                    (B.4) 
i.e. 11 =−ηη BVA                                                                (B.5) 





A                                                                 (B.6) 





AV =                                                                        (B.7) 
Substitute into (A.2), we solve VB in terms of P: 
                        














VB                  (B.8)                        
Combined with (A.3), we obtained P in the implicit function: 
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( ) ( )













                                                (B.9) 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Manager’s value function satisfies the following ODE: 
( ) ( )( )[ ]mPkCVmDVfVUUVU VVV ++−+++= 12
1 22 δµσβ       (B.10) 
The homogeneous part of the above ODE is: 
0
2
1 22 =−+ UVUUV VVV βµσ                                                 (B.11) 






















=                                      (B.12) 
It is obvious that one root is positive and the other is negative since β is always positive.  
The general solution of the homogeneous ODE is in the form: 
−+ += γγ VBVBU h 21                                                      (B.13) 
Manager’s value must approach to the asset value asymptotically, so B1 must be zero. 
Henceforth we suppress the subscript. If we can find a particular solution for ODE 
(A.12), then we can obtain the general solution, which is the linear combination of the 
solution to the homogeneous part and the particular solution. By inspecting (A.12), we 
conjecture that the particular solution is in the form of  
DVCVA ′+′+′ η  
substitute into (A.10), we have: 
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( )( ) ( ) ( )



























             
(B.14) 
The subscripts are derivatives, develop the above equation on derivatives of V, we have 
  
( ) ( )


























               
(B.15)     
The coefficients must be zero to make the above left side equals to zero: 
( ) 0))(()(1
2
1 2 =−++′−′−+−′ AmPfAAA εβηδµηησ                                    (B.16) 
0))(()( =′−++′− βδεδµ CPfC                                                                    (B.17) 












εβ                            (B.18) 

























++−=′                                                     (B.21) 
Hence we obtain the particular solution for (A.12). Combine the solution to the 
homogeneous part and the particular solution, the general solution is in the form of  
DVCVABVU ′+′+′+= ηγ                                                 (B.22) 
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in which A’, C’ and D’ are stated above. B is to be decided by the boundary condition 
U(VB)=0, i.e. manager’s value function equals to zero when the firm is bankrupt. 





  We use simple search algorithm to find the pair of the principal amount P and the 
rollover rate m that optimizes the manager’s value function (24). We choose the baseline 
parameters and parameter ranges according to the descriptive statistics from our 
empirical investigation of the second essay. The baseline drift and volatility are 0.1 and 
0.3, which are the medians of our total samples. The ranges for the drift and volatility are 
-0.1 to 0.24 and 0.2 to 0.45, matching the lower and upper quartile for these parameters 
of our total samples. 
            Throughout the numerical procedure, the initial value V0 is 100, the project 
investment is 90, and the risk free rate r is 6%. We use nested loops of P and m to carry 
out the search process. Our search range for P is from 0 to 90, since the principal amount 
must be less or equal the investment needs, I.  The incremental steps are 0.1 for P from 0 
to 1 and 1 for P from 1 to 90, Our search range for m from 0.01 to 5, corresponding to the 
average maturity range from less than 3 months to 100 years. The incremental steps are 
0.01 for m from 0.01 to 0.1, 0.02 for m from 0.1 to 1 and 0.5 for m from 1 to 5.   
   For each loop iteration with known P and m , we calculate coupon rate C and 
endogenous bankruptcy level VB  by Proposition 1.  We then calculate the manager’s 
value function by Proposition 2. After running through all the iterations of P and m, we 
find the optimal capital structure (P, C, m) that achieves the maximum of manager’s 
value function (24).  
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APPENDIX D  
DESCRIPTION OF CONTROL VARIABLES 
1. NDTTA: Non-debt tax shields scaled by total assets. Our calculation follows 





in which OI is operating income(data13) , i is interest expense(data15), T 
(data16)is federal income tax payments, TR is the statutory tax rate.  
2. Logasset: the logarithm of the book value of firm’s total assets(data6). 
3. B/M ratio: Book to market ratio of total assets. Book value of total assets(data6). 
Market value of total assets is the sum of book value of liabilities(data181) and 
market capitalization.  
4. Tangibility: the value of tangible assets(data8) scaled by total assets(data6). 
5. Mktlev: the market leverage defined by total liabilities(data181) divided by the 
sum of total liabilities and market value of equity.  
6. Profitability: the profitability is defined as operating income before depreciation 
scales by book value of total assets(data6); 
7. Invcr: the dummy for investment tax credit, taking value of one if investment tax 
credit is greater than zero, and zero otherwise. 
8. Losscarry: the dummy for operating loss carryforward, taking value of one if 
operating loss carryforward is greater than zero, and zero otherwise. 
9. Regulate: the dummy variable, taking value of one if regulated firm, zero 
otherwise. 
10. Rating: S&P Long-term Debt Domestic Credit Rating(SPDRC). 
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11. Term: 30-year U.S. treasury yield minus the six-month U.S. treasury yield. 
12. Assetmat: Asset maturity, defines as gross property, plant and equipment (PPE) 
divided by depreciation expense. 
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